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Introducti on 
A basic tenet of social psychology is that people tend 
to go beyond the available, objective evidence when 
perceiving and evaluating others and themselves (Higgins & 
Bargh, 1987). One of the primary internal factors that 
influences how social information is perceived and processed 
is the individual's belief, or expectancy, about what the 
outcome will be in a given social situation. These 
expectancies are robust and tend to be maintained even when 
they are inconsistent with actual outcomes. The perceptions 
and interpretations of events are often distorted in order 
to support currently held beliefs (Miller & Turnbull, 1986). 
The nature of this information processing bias appears 
to depend on the amount of knowledge on which the expectancy 
is based (Markus, 1977). When an individual has only very 
limited knowledge about another person, such as during the 
impression formation stage of a social encounter, cognitive 
processing tends to be biased in favor of information that 
is inconsistent with general expectancies (Crocker, Taylor & 
Fiske, 1984; Stangor & Ruble, 1989; Belmore, 1987). Once 
enough information is gained to form an expectancy for this 
individual, additional information is processed with an 
expectancy-consistent bias in order to preserve this 
expectancy (Crocker, Taylor & Fiske, 1984). 
Expectancy-consistent cognitive biases have a 
significant impact in several areas of psychological 
functioning, including self-concept formation and depression 
(Higgins & Bargh, 1987). In self-concept formation, 
information related to the self is subject to cognitive 
distortion as individuals strive to maintain a stable sense 
of who they are and try to predict their future outcomes 
(Fazio, Effrein, & Falender, 1981). Depressed individuals 
tend to predict a generally negative future for themselves 
as compared to nondepressed individuals, and therefore tend 
to be biased in favor of processing pessimistic information 
about possible future outcomes (Segal, 1988). Nondepressed 
individuals exhibit a generally optimistic outlook regarding 
their future, and therefore tend to be biased toward 
optimistic information about their possible future outcomes 
(Markus & Nurius, 1986). Thus, expectancy-consistent biases 
appear to maintain current mood states of depressed and 
nondepressed individuals by determining whether pessimistic 
or optimistic information is available in the self-concept 
(Markus & Nurius, 1986). 
The present study examined whether expectancy-
inconsistent cognitive biases could be triggered in 
depressed and nondepressed individuals when they were 
presented with information about their possible future. It 
was predicted that this would occur when possible outcomes 
were considered from the relatively distal future (25 
years), as opposed to the relatively proximal future (2 
months). This prediction is based on the assumption that 
with only limited knowledge available regarding their distal 
future, individuals will experience the same cognitive 
biases as found during impression formation, causing 
information that was inconsistent with general expectations 
to receive more extensive processing. On the other hand, it 
was assumed that individuals would have sufficient 
information about their relatively proximal future to form 
expectancies, and that any additional information related to 
possible events in this time span would be subject to an 
expectancy-consistent bias. These predictions were tested 
by examining mood, recall, and self-focusing effects for 
depressed and nondepressed subjects after they were provided 
with information about either positive or negative outcome 
scenarios set in either the proximal or distal future. 
Because self-focus is linked closely to mood changes in 
depression (Pyszczynski, Holt & Greenberg, 1987), the 
effects of this manipulation on level of self-focus were 
also examined. 
Cognitive Biases in Perception 
Individuals are presented with an immense amount of 
information in social situations. If all of the information 
in such contexts received an equal share of the individual's 
limited cognitive resources, normal functioning would be 
impossible. One way this potential overload is managed is 
through the selective processing of information; in other 
words, social information is subject to cognitive biases. 
These biases are determined in large part by expectations 
for the behavior of others (Miller & Turnbull, 1986; Markus 
& Zajonc, 1985; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). 
Research has shown that people are biased toward 
processing expectancy-consistent information in order to 
maintain existing beliefs (Higgins, King & Mavin, 1982; 
Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Wyer, Bodenhausen, & 
Srull, 1984). They do this by seeking out and remembering 
information that is consistent with their beliefs (Snyder & 
Cantor, 1979; Snyder & Swann, 1978; Rothbart, Evans, & 
Fulero, 1979), by mis-labeling and mis-interpreting what 
they see as consistent with their expectancies (Jones, 
Farina, Hastorf, Markus, Miller, & Scott, 1984), and by 
persisting in their original beliefs even when the 
information that the initial impression is based upon is 
completely discredited (Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975). The 
phenomenon of cognitive distortion that leads people to 
perceive what they expect regardless of the evidence has 
substantial empirical support (Snyder, 1984; Hastorf & 
Cantril, 1954; Darley & Gross, 1983; Ickes, Patterson, 
Rajecki, Tanford, 1982; Hilton & Darley, 1985). 
Information regarding one's self is also subject to 
cognitive biases (Markus & Wurf, 1987; Kihlstrom & Cantor, 
1984). For example, numerous studies have found that 
stimulus materials that are highly self-descriptive are 
processed quickly, efficiently, and confidently (Markus, 
1977; Kuiper & Rogers, 1979; Mueller, 1982). Recall and 
recognition for self-relevant stimuli is also enhanced 
relative to memory about others or to nonsocial information 
(Wallen, 1942; Cartwright, 1956; Bower & Gilligan, 1979; 
Hull & Levy, 1979; Kuiper & Rogers, 1979; Greenwald, 1980; 
Markus, 1980; Strube, Berry, Lott, Fogelman, Steinhart, et 
al, 1986). Individuals have also been shown to resist 
processing information that is incongruent with the beliefs 
they have about themselves, rejecting accounts of their 
behavior that differ from their own accounts (Greenwald, 
1980; Markus, 1977, Swann & Read, 1981; Swann & Hill, 1982). 
In addition, any behavior individuals enact that is 
inconsistent with their self-view is likely to be attributed 
situationally (Kulik, Sledge, Mahler, 1986). 
Self-Concept Model 
Markus and her colleagues (Markus & Wurf, 1987; Markus 
& Nurius, 1986, 1987; Markus & Kunda, 1986) have proposed a 
model that attempts to account for cognitive biases 
concerning self—related information. According to this 
model, self-knowledge is contained in a pool of self-
conceptions, with a subset of these self-conceptions 
currently "on—line" and active in conscious awareness. This 
subset is termed the working self—concept because it is the 
set of beliefs that filters and assigns meaning to 
perceptions about the self. As such, the working self-
concept is considered responsible for direct influences on 
the individual's emotional state and behavior. Core self-
conceptions, organized into self-schemas, reside in the 
working self-concept to provide continuity and a sense of 
identity. Adaptability to changing circumstances is 
provided by a pool of peripheral self-conceptions which are 
not routinely involved in information processing, but which 
can be activated in response to situational cues or demands. 
As a particular self-conception becomes relevant to a given 
situation, it can be accessed to provide relevant self-
knowledge. 
In an early study partially supporting this model, 
Markus (1977; study 1) showed that the degree of knowledge 
one has about the self in a particular domain influences how 
beliefs are maintained. In her study, subjects that 
demonstrated strong self-relevant beliefs and values in a 
particular domain were considered self-schematic for that 
domain because of the apparent development of a knowledge 
structure for the self in that domain. Those who did not 
show such beliefs were considered aschematic for that 
domain. Self-schematic subjects showed a bias for 
adjectives consistent with their self-schema in a recall 
task. Aschematics showed no such difference in recall. 
Self—schematic individuals were also more confident in their 
prediction of obtaining schema-congruent outcomes in the 
future, and of avoiding schema-incongruent outcomes, as 
compared to aschematics. This suggests that existing 
beliefs about the self in a particular domain promote views 
of the self in the future which are consistent with current 
beliefs, while the absence of such beliefs promotes 
uncertainty about the future. 
A second study, (Markus, 1977; study 2), also supported 
the self-concept model. When self-schematic and aschematic 
individuals were presented with feedback on a task that was 
incongruent with their self-schemas, individuals with self-
schemas were more likely to consider, but then reject, 
information incongruent with the self—concept whereas 
aschematics incorporated this new information into their 
self-descriptions. This study suggests that the processing 
of new information about the self in a particular domain 
depends on whether a body of self-relevant knowledge already 
exists for that domain. 
In addition to current self-images, future-oriented 
self-conceptions are available for activation into the 
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working self-concept for use in processing information. 
Markus and Nurius (1986) found that most people were able to 
conceptualize goals, characteristics, general descriptors, 
or adjectives that could possibly describe themselves at 
some point in the future. This repertoire of possible 
selves is described as "the cognitive manifestation of 
enduring goals, aspirations, motives, fears and threats" (p. 
158). Possible selves can be positive or negative, 
representing "the ideal selves that we would very much like 
to become [,] . . . the selves we could become, and the 
selves we are afraid of becoming" (Markus & Nurius, 1986, p. 
954). Because they are so central to one's view of the 
self, possible selves are hypothesized to play a crucial 
role in the experience of affect. The possible selves that 
are currently activated in the working self-concept are 
considered responsible for providing the evaluative context 
that determines the individual's affect experience. If the 
working self-concept is dominated by conceptions of negative 
possibility, then the individual is vulnerable to 
experiencing the associated negative affect. 
In the Markus and Nurius (1986) research, possible 
selves were assessed using a checklist of 150 possibilities 
for the self which had been previously developed by asking 
another group of students to "tell us about what is possible 
for you". Subjects also rated the probability of each 
possible self checked, and their current mood and sense of 
hopelessness. An overall positive bias in the endorsements 
of the possible selves was found and considered a reflection 
of general optimism about future events. Acknowledgment of 
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negative possible selves was related to self-reports of 
negative evaluation of the self in the past. In addition, 
higher probability ratings for negative possible selves were 
related to negative affect and feelings of hopelessness. 
From this research, they concluded that possible selves 
constitute "an independent dimension within the self-
concept related to the individual's current affective state" 
and suggest that "the nature of an individual's working 
self-concept states could vary systematically with that 
individual's affective and motivational state, and vice 
versa" (p. 960). They concluded that possible selves are as 
labile as mood, and that a change in one will be reflected 
in changes in the other. Just as mood was shown to be 
related with a change in self-concept, the self-concept, 
specifically possible selves, should change to reflect an 
alteration in mood. 
Cognitive Biases in Depression 
The activation of self-conceptions, including possible 
selves, into the working self-concept depends on the demands 
of the situation, and on the cognitive biases which 
influence how these demands are perceived and interpreted. 
For a given individual, some self—conceptions are more 
easily activated from memory than others, reflecting 
individual differences in construct-accessibi1ity (Bargh & 
Tota, 1988; Erdley & D'Agostino, 1988; Higgins & King, 1981; 
Wyer, Bodenhausen & Srull, 1984). Construct accessibility 
refers to the ease or readiness with which a construct is 
used in information processing (Segal, 1988; Higgins, Rholes 
& Jones, 1977; Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966). A self-
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conception will be activated if it is highly accessible due 
to frequency of prior activation or motivational 
significance, or if it is highly salient in the current 
circumstances (Strauman & Higgins, 1987). 
Almost all cognitive theories of depression consider 
pessimism to be central to the experience of negative mood. 
Beck's (1967) theory of depression has as its central 
component the depressive triad, a set of negative beliefs, 
or schemata, about one's self, one's world, and one's 
future. This depressive self-schema is postulated to 
continually distort self-relevant thoughts. According to 
Beck's (1967, 1976) cognitive model of depression, these 
negative evaluations are a core symptom and cause of 
depression. In this theory, depressives process self-
relevant information using a systematic bias against the 
self in which they selectively abstract negative details of 
environmental events, overgeneralize others, and make 
arbitrary inferences based on information insufficient to 
justify their conclusions. According to Beck, these 
distorted inferences are produced by a collection of 
pervasive negative beliefs about the self and its relation 
to the world and the future. 
Consistent with this theory, research has indicated 
that depressives are more pessimistic about their own 
futures than nondepressives. Beck (1967) found that 78% of 
the depressed patients in his study reported negative 
expectations about the future, as compared with 22% of the 
nondepressed subjects. Lobitz and Post (1979) found that 
depressed subjects expected less successful performance for 
11) 
themselves on laboratory tasks than nondepressed subjects. 
Other research has shown that depressed subjects view sad 
events as more likely to happen to themselves than to an 
acquaintance, and that depressed subjects consider sad 
events as more likely to happen to themselves than do 
nondepressed persons (Pietromonaco and Markus, 1985; 
Pyszczynski, Holt & Greenberg, 1987, Study 1). 
Research on cognitive processes suggests that negative 
self-schemata influence the probability judgments of future 
positive and negative life events (Kuiper, Derry & 
MacDonald, 1982). A large number of studies have 
demonstrated that depressed individuals think more 
negatively about themselves than about others, and that this 
negativity pervades all aspects of their information 
processing (Derry & Kuiper, 1981; Kuiper & Derry, 1981; 
Kuiper & MacDonald, 1982); Ingram, Smith, & Brehm, 1983; 
Kuiper & Higgins, 1985; Pietromonaco, 1985). 
Depressed individuals have a strong bias toward 
processing expectancy-congruent (i.e. negative) information 
about the self. They appear more willing to focus on 
negative feedback, both realistic and unrealistic, than 
nondepressed individuals (Alloy & Abramson, 1988). This 
pessimistic bias may serve to maintain a continuity within 
the self-concepts of these individuals, reflecting the 
easily accessible negative self-conceptions used for 
processing information about the self (Bargh & Tota, 1988; 
Segal, 1988, Kuiper, Derry, & MacDonald, 1982). 
;l. 1 
Cognitive Biases During Impression Formation 
Biases that serve to maintain existing beliefs have 
been shown to be reversed at the time that the beliefs are 
in the initial formation stage. At this point, expectancy-
inconsistent information appears to be processed more 
extensively than expectancy-consistent information (Higgins 
& Bargh, 1987). Several memory studies have found, for 
example, that under impression formation conditions, 
expectancy-inconsistent information is recalled better than 
expectancy-consistent information (Belmore, 1987; Hastie & 
Kumar, 1979; Srull, 1981; Srul1, Lichtenstein & Rothbart, 
1985). 
In a study by Hastie and Kumar (1979), subjects were 
given a description of a target person in the form of a list 
of adjectives related to the same trait (e.g. honest) and 
were then asked to read a list of behaviors performed by the 
target that were either consistent or inconsistent with the 
trait description, or irrelevant to it. Recall results 
showed that the behaviors that were inconsistent with the 
initial trait description were recalled better than those 
that were consistent with it, with the irrelevant behaviors 
being recalled least. Hastie (1980) interpreted these 
results as indicating elaborate processing of inconsistent 
information, resulting in associative linkages in memory as 
subjects attempted to integrate them into a unitary 
impression. 
In their review of this literature, Higgins and Bargh 
(1987) concluded that the Hastie and Kumar (1979) studies, 
and subsequent research in their paradigm, concern 
impression formation and not impression testing. "The 
findings therefore should not be interpreted as showing that 
information inconsistent with a well-formed prior belief is 
better recalled. They must be understood in the context of 
other research that demonstrates the greater attention and 
processing given to relatively infrequent behaviors during 
impression formation, and their resultant increased 
accessibility in memory (e.g. Hamilton & Gifford, 1976; 
Fiske, 1980; Hamilton, Dugan & Trolier, 1985; Ruble & 
Stangor, 1986)" (Higgins & Bargh, 1987, p. 382). 
This research suggests that social expectancies can be 
viewed in a developmental framework, consistent with 
cognitive-developmental hypotheses that posit heightened 
sensitivity to relevant information as knowledge about a 
social domain is being formed (Kohlberg, 1966; Ruble, 1987). 
As expectancies are being formed, individuals initially may 
seek out and elaborately process relevant information to 
check the match with the developing expectancy. Uncertainty 
and a lack of information at this stage biases cognitive 
processing in favor of discrepant information. Once the 
expectancy develops past this initial uncertainty and 
becomes established, new information serves more to 
challenge the existing expectancy than to add to it. At 
this point, processing begins to be biased in favor of 
expectancy-consistent information in order to help maintain 
the expectancy (Stangor & Ruble, 1989; Crocker, Taylor & 
Fiske, 1984; Crocker, Hannah, & Weber, 1983). 
The same cognitive processes related to social 
information seem likely to apply to self-relevant 
information. Although the self is generally viewed in the 
literature as a uniquely wel1-developed and highly organized 
belief system (Higgins & Bargh, 1987), it appears to be as 
susceptible to the same cognitive processing effects as any 
other set of beliefs, such as expectancies for others (Bower 
& Gilligan, 1979; Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Kihlstrom & Cantor, 
1984). Just as expectancy-consistent biases have been found 
in the processing of self—relevant information where an 
expectancy is well developed (Markus, 1977), expectancy-
inconsistent biases appear likely when self—relevant 
information is encountered and the related expectancy is 
poorly developed. This type of impression formation bias is 
most likely to occur during the formation of possible self-
conceptions in areas which are unfamiliar, yet relevant to 
the individual. 
Possible selves are formed in the course of processing 
internally or externally derived information in terms of the 
self (Markus & Wurf, 1987). By their nature, possible 
selves are inferences about future outcomes and are less 
tied to reality than other self-conceptions. Individuals 
are free to consider a broad array of possible outcomes for 
any given event in their future. When presented with self-
relevant information pertaining to a particular potential 
outcome, a possible self is generated and evaluated in light 
of the individual's expectancies for that domain (Markus & 
Nurius, 1986). 
When the individual has considerable experience in a 
particular domain, expectancies for future outcomes in that 
domain will be well developed. Markus (1977) found, for 
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example, that subjects with well-developed beliefs for a 
particular behavioral domain were more confident in their 
predictions of their own behavior in that domain. The 
development of possible selves for behavioral domains with 
wel1-developed expectancies would be subject to expectancy-
consistent processing bias. In other words, information 
about expectancy-consistent possible selves would receive 
more attention and processing than information that reflects 
expectancy-inconsistent outcomes. 
When expectancies are absent or poorly developed, 
however, information about possible outcomes for the self 
that are inconsistent with general expectancies for the 
future would likely receive elaborate processing in the same 
manner as during impression formation. Markus and Nurius 
(1986) point out that "as representations of potential, 
possible selves will thus be particularly sensitive to those 
situations that communicate new or inconsistent information 
about the self" (p. 956). Encountering information about a 
possible outcome in a domain that has not been previously 
considered would prompt a new possible self, which would 
then be examined in light of general expectancies for the 
future. A possible self generated in this manner that 
contradicts general expectations for the future may receive 
more elaborate processing than an expectancy-consistent 
possible self as the expectancy is developed. This would be 
especially true of possible selves in domains of anticipated 
behavior. Whereas much expectancy-inconsistent information 
would be dismissed out-of—hand due to its lack of personal 
relevance, this would not be the case for information 
pertaining to plans for the future, such as anticipated life 
role behavior. 
It follows from this line of reasoning that, given 
their different general expectancies for the future, 
depressed and nondepressed would be biased in favor of 
different possible selves under impression formation 
conditions. Given their generally pessimistic outlook on 
the future, depressed individuals would be biased in favor 
of information suggesting positive possible selves in 
domains where specific expectancies were absent or poorly 
developed. Similarly, given the optimistic bias of 
nondepressed individuals, they would be inclined to favor 
information suggesting negative possible selves under these 
circumstances. Thus, while the expectancy-consistent 
processing biases of depressed and nondepressed individuals 
have been clearly demonstrated, the present discussion 
presents a potential means of reversing this processing 
mode. 
Outcome Deoendencv 
Another important factor shown to influence the effect 
of new information is perceived personal relevance. 
Information receives more attention when it is perceived to 
be relevant to future outcomes. Erber and Fiske (1984, 
study 1) found that outcome dependency increased attention 
to information, particularly when it was inconsistent with 
advance expectancies. They speculated that individuals will 
try harder to predict situations that matter to them. Since 
inconsistent information is potentially more informative 
than consistent information (Jones & McGillis, 1976), 
successful prediction may require that attention be directed 
to expectancy-inconsistent information. 
Normative life roles are anticipated by the individual 
and considered important. From a family life-cycle 
perspective, the progression of these life roles is single 
young adult, married without children, parent with young 
children, parent with adolescent children, and parent with 
adult children (Carter & McGoldrick, 1980). The development 
of expectancies for these life roles begins through 
anticipatory socialization (Merton, 1957), and accelerates 
as an individual comes closer to actually assuming the role. 
The full development of expectancies for the myriad 
situations to be faced in each life role is not possible, 
however, without actual experience in that role. 
The life role occupied by the typical college student 
is that of single young adult. Through their experience, 
they will have developed expectancies for situations 
associated with this role. One of the situations likely to 
have well-developed expectations is that involving 
interacting with family members or close friends in the near 
future. The possible outcomes of such interactions are 
likely to be familiar and important for these individuals. 
For the young adult college student, information relevant to 
possible interactions with family members or friends in the 
near future (i.e. within the present life-cycle role) should 
be processed in light of wel1-developed expectancies for 
these situations. Such information should then be subject 
to the expectancy-consistent bias that accompanies well-
developed expectancies. 
The cognitive response should be different, however, 
when information is considered that bears on an anticipated, 
yet distal life role. One such role likely to be part of an 
individual's life plan, yet relatively unfamiliar to the 
typical college student, is the role of parent of an adult 
child. Expectancies about possible outcomes of interactions 
between parent and adult child from a parental perspective 
will not be well developed in the young adult college 
student. This is a function of the remoteness of this role 
from that of single young adult in terms of the family life-
cycle, as well as the length of the time span between these 
two roles, likely to be in the neighborhood of 25 years. 
Information related to possible interactions in a distal 
life role, such as interacting with an adult child as a 
parent, should be processed in the context of only 
generalized expectancies regarding the future, rather than 
well-developed expectancies specific to that behavioral 
domain. Such information should therefore be subject to the 
expectancy-inconsistent bias found in impression formation. 
Because depressed individuals have generally 
pessimistic expectations about their future, young adult 
college students who are depressed are likely to have self-
conceptions of failure and unhappiness regarding anticipated 
events, such as interactions with family members or friends 
in the proximal future. Information suggesting negative 
possible outcomes of such events will be readily imported 
into the working self—concept because of the expectancy-
consistent bias. Information about possible positive 
outcomes will be subject to bias in the face of the existing 
expectancies and will be discounted or not attended to. 
Information related to negative possibilities will serve to 
confirm the pessimistic outlook for the near future, 
maintaining depressed mood. 
When presented with the same information relating to 
possible outcomes in a distal life role, however, depressed 
individuals should exhibit a bias toward positive 
information because it is inconsistent with their generally 
pessimistic expectancies. In other words, depressed 
individuals should regard the possibility that they may be a 
happy and good parent to their adult child in 25 years as 
expectancy-inconsistent; it should also be interesting, 
however, because there will be no specific negative 
expectancy to contradict this positive possibility. It 
should, in fact, be more interesting to them than negative 
possibilities due to the individual's efforts to reconcile 
incongruent information as a specific expectancy is being 
formed. Nondepressed single young college students should 
mirror the depressed students in the expectancy—consistent 
and expectancy-inconsistent biases they exhibit when 
presented with information related to possible proximal and 
distal future outcomes, respectively. Their processing 
should favor positive over negative outcomes related to 
interactions with family members or friends in the next few 
months, whereas processing should favor negative over 
positive possibilities related to the distal role of parent 
of an adult child. As for the depressed students, this 
reflects the different level of development of expectancies 
for these two behavioral domains, with specific, positive 
19 
expectancies relevant to the proximal domain and only a 
general, optimistic expectancy relevant to the distal 
domain. 
Recall. Mood and Self-Focus Effect 
The purpose of the present study was to demonstrate the 
cognitive bias effects proposed above through an 
experimental manipulation procedure. Because of their 
essentially cognitive nature, these biases are not directly 
observable and therefore must be inferred from observable 
events, such as subject self-reports. Three such measures 
were used as dependent variables in this study: 1) recall of 
manipulation stimulus materials; 2) mood following the 
manipulation; and 3) level of state self-focus following the 
manipulation. Each of these variables was considered able 
to provide indications of the cognitive biases in question. 
Recall has been shown to relate to enhanced cognitive 
processing, and has been used extensively in research on 
cognitive biases (Wyer, Bodenhausen, & Srull, 1984; Erber & 
Fiske, 1984; Belmore, 1987), and has been shown to predict 
attention (Berscheid, Graziano, Monson, & Dermer, 1976). 
Recall measures used in these studies typically consist of 
free or prompted recall of details from the experimental 
stimulus materials after a delay of a few minutes, usually 
with an intervening task to reduce rehearsal. 
Mood is predicted to change due to the effects that 
processing self—related information will have on the self-
concept. As discussed above, there is preliminary evidence 
that possible selves play a major role in determining 
current mood when they are active in an individual's working 
self-concept (Markus & Wurf, 1987; Markus & Nurius, 1986). 
Because cognitive biases have been shown to determine what 
self-conceptions are attended to and accessed by the working 
self-concept, self-reports of current mood may indicate the 
type of bias employed to process self-related information. 
The relationship of mood to cognitive biases is 
complicated however, by the individual's level of self-focus 
when considering information related to possible positive 
and negative outcomes. When presented with negative 
feedback, for example, depressed individuals generally 
respond with higher levels of self-focus (Greenberg & 
Pyszczynski, 1986; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1985, 1986), 
while nondepressed individuals tend to exhibit the opposite 
pattern (Gibbons & Wicklund, 1976). Given the finding that 
focusing attention on the self tends to heighten emotional 
experiences (Gibbons, 1990; Carver & Scheier, 1977), 
depressed individuals are likely to exhibit a stronger 
affective response following exposure to negative feedback 
than nondepressed individuals. In other words, the type of 
bias applied by nondepressed individuals when processing 
negative information may not be reflected in their mood 
scores. 
The same confound applies to how depressed individuals 
may react to positive feedback. Depressed individuals have 
been shown to avoid self-focus when given positive outcome 
feedback (Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1986; Pyszczynski & 
Greenberg, 1985, 1986). When depressed individuals decrease 
their self-focus, they experience an increase in optimism 
(Pyszczynski, Holt, & Greenberg, 1987) which should lead to 
improvements in positive mood (Markus & Nurius, 1986). 
Hence, improvements in mood after exposure to information 
about possible positive outcomes may occur as a result of a 
decrease in self—focus rather than as a consequence of 
incorporating positive possible selves into the working 
self-concept. In order to sort out these potentially 
confounding effects, self—focus will be assessed immediately 
after the assessment of mood following presentation of the 
manipulation. 
Self—focus may serve a more important role, however, as 
an indicator of a processing bias difference between 
proximal and distal possible selves. Self-focus studies 
that have looked at how depressed and nondepressed subjects 
respond to negative or positive feedback have typically 
utilized some type of bogus task that, when completed by the 
subject, is "scored" by the experimenter who then provides 
the subject with either positive or negative feedback 
(Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1986; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 
1985, 1986; Ingram, Cruet, Johnson, & Wisnicki, 1988). 
Findings of these studies suggest that this type of feedback 
is cognitively processed with an expectancy-consistent 
biases. 
Given that self-focus increases the influence of the 
working self—concept on various cognitive processes (Carver 
& Scheier, 1981; Hull & Levy, 1979), increased self-focus by 
depressed subjects when presented with negative information 
suggests that they are attending to and processing this 
information because of its congruence with the overall 
negativity of their current self-concepts. Nondepressed 
subjects exhibit expectancy-consistent bias by decreasing or 
avoiding self-focus in the face of negative feedback 
(Gibbons & Wicklund, 1976). Self-focusing responses to 
positive feedback by depressed and nondepressed individuals 
also suggest a expectancy-consistent bias in these studies; 
depressed individuals avoid self-focus enhancing stimuli 
(Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1986), while increased self-focus 
is associated with positive outlooks by nondepressed 
individuals (Pyszczynski, Holt, & Greenberg, 1987). 
The negative and positive feedback provided to subjects 
in this study is intended to bypass expectancy-consistent 
biases, and therefore should produce different self-focusing 
responses than have been found in previous studies. To the 
extent that the proximal possible self feedback condition 
promotes expectancy-inconsistent biases, the previously 
reported self-focusing patterns of depressed and 
nondepressed individuals should be reversed in the distal 
condition. In other words, depressed individuals should 
show an increase, and nondepressed individuals a decrease, 
in self-focusing following exposure to positive possible 
selves in the distal condition, with this pattern reversed 
after exposure to negative possible selves in the distal 
condition. 
•vervi ew 
The present study examines the ways that depressed and 
nondepressed people react to information about positive or 
negative possible outcomes for themselves in either the 
proximal (2 months from now) or distal (25 years from now) 
future. These independent variables were analyzed with a 2 
X 2 X 2 (depression X proximity X valence) randomized 
factorial design. The three primary dependent variables 
were recall, mood, and self-focus. The recall hypotheses 
were tested with an analysis of variance (ANOVA) procedure, 
and the mood and self-focus variables were analyzed with an 
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) procedure. Each dependent 
variable was analyzed separately. Additional measures were 
included to confirm that the experimental manipulation had 
the desired effect. Each of these measures was also 
analyzed with the ANOVA procedure. 
Hypotheses 
Previous research has demonstrated that when presented 
with information about which they have a well-developed 
expectancy, depressed and nondepressed individuals are 
biased toward processing information which is consistent 
with their existing expectancy (i.e. they will exhibit an 
expectancy-consistent bias). This means that depressed 
individuals should be biased in favor of processing negative 
possible selves rather than positive possible selves, and 
that nondepressed individuals will be biased toward 
processing positive possible selves rather than negative 
possible selves. 
This effect was expected to be reflected in this study 
as better recall for details of the expectancy-consistent 
possible self information than for the expectancy-
inconsistent possible self information in the proximal 
condition. Mood scores in the proximal condition were 
expected to reflect the expectancy-consistent bias by 
remaining equal across the valence conditions. In other 
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words, depressed individuals were expected to report 
comparably depressed mood regardless of whether they were in 
the positive or negative outcome condition, and nondepressed 
individuals were expected to maintain positive mood scores 
after exposure to negative as well as positive possible 
outcomes in the proximal condition. 
Self-focus was expected to be generally higher for the 
depressed individuals than for the nondepressed individuals 
in the proximal condition due to findings showing that 
depressed individuals generally engage in higher levels of 
self-focus than do nondepressed individuals (cf. Ingram, 
Lumry, Cruet, & Sieber, 1987; Smith, Ingram, & Roth, 1985). 
Also, following from previous findings indicating that 
depressed individuals tend to avoid self-focus after 
exposure to positive feedback, it was predicted that 
depressed subjects presented with information about possible 
positive outcomes in the proximal future would show lower 
self—focus than depressed individuals in the negative 
outcome condition. 
The predictions unique to this study are based on the 
hypothesis that depressed and nondepressed individuals will 
process information about expectancy-inconsistent possible 
selves more extensively than expectancy-consistent possible 
selves in behavioral domains which have poorly-developed 
expectancies. It was predicted that this expectancy-
inconsistent bias will be strong enough to override the 
expectancy-consistent biases that have been found for 
behavioral domains with well—developed expectancies. The 
specific predictions are: 
all. 
Depressed subjects presented with information 
about possible positive outcomes in the distal 
future will recall more of this information than 
depressed subjects presented with information 
about possible negative outcomes in the distal 
future. 
[Dep/distal/(+) > dep/distal/(—)]. 
Depressed subjects presented with information 
about possible positive outcomes in the distal 
future will recall more of this information than 
depressed subjects presented with information 
about possible positive outcomes in the proximal 
future. 
[Dep/distal/(+) > dep/proximal/(+)3. 
Nondepressed subjects presented with information 
about possible negative outcomes in the distal 
future will recall more of this information than 
nondepressed subjects presented with information 
about possible positive outcomes in the distal 
future. 
[Nondep/distal/(-) > nondep/distal/(+)]. 
Nondepressed subjects presented with information 
about possible negative outcomes in the distal 
future will recall more of this information than 
nondepressed subjects presented with information 
about possible negative outcomes in the proximal 
future. 
[Nondep/distal/(—) > nondep/proximal/(—)]. 
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Mood. 
5) Depressed subjects are expected to show more 
positive mood after presented with information 
about positive possible outcomes in the distal 
future than following presentation of information 
about proximal, positive possible outcomes. 
[Pep/distal/(-) > dep/proximal/(-)3. 
6) Nondepressed subjects are expected to show more 
negative mood after being presented with 
information about possible negative outcomes in 
the distal future than following presentation of 
information about possible negative outcomes in 
the proximal future. 
CNondep/distal/ (-) > nondep/proximal/(-)]. 
Self-Focus. 
7) Depressed subjects are predicted to show higher 
levels of self-focus after being presented with 
information about possible positive outcomes in 
the distal future than following presentation of 
information about possible positive outcomes in 
the proximal future. 
[Pep/distal/(+) > dep/proximal/(+)]. 
8) Nondepressed subjects are predicted to show higher 
levels of self-focus after being presented with 
information about possible negative outcomes in 
the distal future than following presentation of 
information about possible negative outcomes in 
the proximal future. 
CNondep/distal/(—) > nondep/proximal/(—)]. 
Method 
Subjects 
Subjects were recruited from the subject pool of the 
Psychology Department at Iowa State University and received 
extra credit for participation. In order to reduce several 
potentially confounding factors, selection of subjects for 
this study was be limited accordingly in three areas: 
gender, family role experience, and the presence or absence 
of depression indicators. Recent evidence points to a 
significant gender effect for self-focusing tendencies 
(Ingram, Cruet, Johnson, & Wisnicki, 1988), such that women 
show a greater propensity to focus attention on the self 
than do men. To rule out this potential bias, as well as to 
reduce other gender effects, only female subjects were used 
in this study. To rule out possible effects from different 
family role experience (e.g. marriage, parenthood), and 
cohort effects, only subjects who were less than 25 years 
old, never married, and childless were included. Also for 
the purposes of the factorial design of this study, only 
those subjects that were classified as either significantly 
depressed or nondepressed were included. 
Measures 
The measures are discussed in the order that they were 
presented during the procedure, with the exception of the 
post-manipulation mood measure, which is discussed along 
with the pre-manipulation mood measure. 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). Pre-classification as 
depressed or nondepressed was based on the results of the 
Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Ward, Mendel son, Mock, & 
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Erbaugh, 1961). The split-half reliability is 
approximately 0.9 and its test-retest reliability is 
approximately 0.75. It has consistently been found to 
correlate well with clinician's ratings of severity of 
depression, as well as with other scales of depression 
(Williams, 1984). The BDI is presented in Appendix A. 
Private Self-Consciousness Scale (PSC). Dispositional 
self-focus was measured using the Private Self-Consciousness 
subscale (PSC) from the Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS) 
(Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). The SCS contains 23 
items that are answered on a 5-point Likert scale, 10 items 
of which assess private self—consciousness and comprise the 
PSC. The SCS as well as the PSC subscale have been used in 
a wide variety of studies of self-focused attention, and 
reliability and validity data have been well established 
(Carver & Scheier, 1981). The PSC is presented in Appendix 
B. 
Mood scales. Mood was measured with two scales, each 
made up of eight mood adjectives selected from the Mood 
Affect Adjective Check List (MAACL; Zuckerman & Lubin, 
1965), plus a ninth item asking about valence of current 
mood. The adjectives comprising the second scale were polar 
opposites of the adjectives in the first scale, providing a 
parallel assessment of mood while reducing transparency of 
the measure (Gibbons & Gerrard, 1989; Gibbons & Boney McCoy, 
in press). Subjects responded to the items on a 13-point 
Likert scale. The ratings of each item were totalled to 
produce a score for each mood scale. Cronbachs alpha 
coefficients for the first and second mood scales were .90 
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and .93, respectively. These scales are presented in 
Appendices D and E. 
State Self-Focus Scale (SSF). Although the PSC was 
developed as a dispositional measure of self-focusing 
tendencies, the items can be changed to produce a 
situational emphasis, as was suggested by Ingram, Cruet, 
Johnson, & Wisnicki (1988). These authors reported 
modifications such as changing the item "I am always trying 
to figure myself out" to "I was trying to figure myself out" 
(p. 969). Similar changes were made in the PSC to produce 
the State Self-Focus (SSF) scale used in this study. The 
SSF scale was designed to assess the effects of the 
experimental manipulation on the subject's current level of 
self-focus. Cronbach's alpha coefficient for this scale was 
.51. This scale is presented in Appendix L. 
Manipulation check items. Five single—item measures to 
assess whether the scenarios were perceived and judged by 
the subjects in the way intended. The similarities (SIM) 
item asked the question "How similar was the situation in 
the journal entry to your current life?" and was answered 
on a 9-point Likert scale (1 = Very Similar; 9 = Very 
Different). The frequency (FREQ) item consisted of the 
question "Before today, how often had you thought about this 
possible situation?" (1 = Very Often; 9 = Never). The ease 
(EASE) item consisted of the question "How easy did you find 
it to imagine yourself in the situation described in the 
journal entry?" (1 = Very Easy; 9 = Very Hard). The 
likelihood (LIKLHD) item consisted of the question "How 
likely do you think you are to actually experience a 
situation similar to the one described in the journal 
entry?" <1 = Very Likely; 9 = Very Unlikely). The 
desirability (DESIR) item consisted of the question "How 
desirable would this situation be to you?" (1 = Very 
Desirable; 9 = Very Undesirable). These measures are 
presented in Appendix M. 
These measures were expected to show that the proximity 
and outcome valence manipulations had their intended effect. 
It was predicted that proximal scenarios would be judged as 
more similar to current experience, and more frequently 
considered than distal scenarios. In addition, subjects 
were expected to be able to imagine the distal scenarios as 
easily as the proximal scenarios, as reflected in the ease 
of consideration item. Positive scenarios were predicted to 
differ from negative scenarios in terms of their 
desirability ratings, with positive scenarios expected to be 
rated as more desirable than negative scenarios. The 
likelihood rating was expected to reflect the optimism and 
pessimism of nondepressed and depressed subjects. Positive 
outcomes were predicted to receive a higher likelihood 
rating from nondepressed than depressed subjects, whereas 
negative outcomes were predicted to be rated as more likely 
by depressed than nondepressed subjects. 
Recall measure. This measure asked subjects to recall 
two different types of information: details presented to the 
subjects in the scenarios (standard recall), and details of 
the scenario that they generated themselves (self-generated 
recall). The main reason for including both types of items 
was essentially practical; the brevity of the scenarios 
limited the number of standard details that could be 
included in a recall measure and self-generated details were 
used to expand the measure. There was a secondary interest 
in how recall of the two types of details would differ, 
although a hypothesis was not generated regarding this 
question. 
The self-generated component of the recall measure 
varied in number of items depending on whether a proximal or 
a distal scenario was presented in the manipulation. The 
self-generated recall component for proximal condition 
scenarios consisted of eight self-generated information 
recall items, whereas the self-generated recall component 
for distal condition scenarios consisted of six self-
generated items. This item total difference in the self-
generated recall measure resulted because two items specific 
to the proximal scenarios were inadvertently used in the 
distal recall measure, requiring them to be disregarded in 
the assessment of self-generated, distal recall. The 
standard recall items were scored by comparing answers to a 
key of correct answers by a judge who was blind to the 
experimental condition of the subjects. An answer was 
scored as correct if it contained a the key word or detail 
listed for that item. For example, the item "When did your 
visitor arrive for the weekend?" was scored correct if the 
answer contained the two words "Saturday" and "noon". The 
self-generated recall items were compared to the details 
provided by the subjects as they filled in the blanks of 
their scenario descriptions. These recall answers were 
scored as correct if they were identical to the previous 
responses. This scoring was also done by a judge who was 
blind to the experimental condition of each subject. This 
measure is presented in Appendix O. 
Procedure 
Subject screening procedure. The Beck Depression 
Inventory (Beck, 1967), the Private Self-Consciousness Scale 
(Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975) and background questions 
regarding gender, age, marital status, and parenthood status 
were administered to a large number of students from the 
subject pool during a mass testing early in the semester and 
again to a new group of students at the midpoint of the 
semester. Subjects meeting these criteria were considered 
for participation if they were classified as depressed or 
nondepressed based on criteria used in other recent research 
on depression (Pyszczynski, Holt & Greenberg, 1987). For 
the purpose of this study, subjects with BDI scores of 10 
and above were classified as depressed; subjects with BDI 
scores of 4 and below were classified as nondepressed. 
Based on these criteria, 70 depressed and 70 nondepressed 
subjects were selected for the study. They were contacted 
by telephone and were told that the purpose of the study was 
to examine how their thoughts and feelings were affected 
after reading a short story. They were told that 
participation consisted of coming to the lab, reading a 
short story, and then filling out several questionnaires 
about their thoughts and feelings. If they agreed to 
participate, a time and date was arranged for them to come 
to the lab to participate in the study. 
Of the depressed subjects contacted, 68 agreed to 
participate, although two subjects produced a high 
proportion of missing values, causing their data to be 
discarded. Of the 70 nondepressed subjects selected and 
contacted for this study, 66 agreed to participate. The 
results of four of these subjects were discarded, however, 
due to their failure to respond to one or more of the 
measures. Thus, the Ns for the depressed and nondepressed 
cells were 66 and 62, respectively. 
Experimental procedure. Prior to coming to the lab to 
participate, the depressed and nondepressed subjects were 
randomly assigned to one of the four experimental 
conditions. Upon arriving at the lab at the arranged time, 
subjects were again told that the study consisted of reading 
a story and answering some questions about their thoughts 
and feelings. The experimental procedure was explained by 
telling them that they would be given four separate 
questionnaire packets during the course of the experiment, 
and that each of these packets would be brought to them by 
the experimenter at given intervals. They were not informed 
about the recall task at this time, however. 
Each subject was then taken into a small lab room and 
left alone to complete the first packet, which consisted of 
the consent form (see Appendix C), the initial mood measure 
(see Appendix D), and brief instructions on what to do with 
the manipulation materials that would be provided to them 
shortly (see Appendices F and G). After five minutes, 
subjects were provided with the scenario specific to their 
assigned experimental condition and told they had 12 minutes 
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to read and complete it (see Appendices H through K). After 
12 minutes, these materials were removed and subjects were 
given the third packet, consisting of the second mood 
measure (see Appendix F), the state self focus measure 
(SSF)(see Appendix L), the five manipulation check items 
(see Appendix M), and a distraction task consisting of a 
bogus opinion scale made up of questions about the opinions 
that others hold about public issues (see Appendix N). 
After exactly ten minutes, this packet was removed and the 
recall measure was administered (see Appendix •). After 
this was complete, subjects were debriefed and thanked for 
their participation. 
Experimental manipulation materials. The manipulation 
was designed to present each subject with a personalized 
scenario that she might imagine as possible for herself in 
the future. These scenarios varied in terms of future 
proximity and outcome valence. The future proximity factor 
consisted of two levels, proximal and distal. Proximal 
scenarios described events as occurring approximately 2 
months in the future, whereas distal scenarios described 
events as occurring 25 years in the future. The outcome 
valence factor consisted of positive and negative outcomes. 
The positive scenario described positive outcomes of events 
(e.g. having a good talk), as well as pleasant circumstances 
(e.g. enjoying nice weather). The negative scenario 
described negative outcomes and circumstances. The stimulus 
material for each condition consisted of a brief first-
person description of the outcome of a potential future 
event, presented as an account made in a personal journal 
-following the event. The event was described in this 
account, along with personal evaluations of the event. 
Blanks were left in several places in the narrative for the 
subject to fill in details to personalize the account. The 
subject was asked to imagine herself in the scenarios and to 
fill in the blanks with relevant details as she imagined 
them (see Appendices H through K). 
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Results 
The hypotheses of this study were organized around 
three dependent variables: recall, mood change, and state 
self-consciousness. The results of the data analyses 
relating to each of these variables are presented separately 
below, with the general results presented within each 
section, followed by the tests of the specific hypotheses 
relating to that variable. Each variable was analyzed in a 
2X2X2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) procedure, the three 
independent variables being: level of depression (DPRN), 
proximity in time (PROX), and valence of the scenario 
outcome (OUTCM). 
Planned comparisons were used to test the stated 
hypotheses. Simple effects were tested for significant 
interactions by t tests. The significance level used for 
the planned comparison t tests, and the ANOVA and ANCOVA F 
tests was q. < .05. Unplanned t test comparisons between 
cells were reported as statistically significant only if a 
probability level of .01 or smaller was attained in order to 
reduce the type one errors (false positive findings), given 
the large number of unplanned tests for simple effects. 
The analyses of several measures relevant to the 
experimental procedure are also presented. These include an 
analysis of mood immediately prior to participation in the 
study to confirm the original classification of subjects 
according to level of depression, and analyses of several 
measures of the subjects' perceptions of the scenarios to 
confirm that the experimental manipulation had the desired 
effect. The results of the 2X2X2 ANOVAs of these 
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measures are presented first, followed by the results of the 
dependent variable analyses. 
Verification of Subject Classification for Depression 
The time lag between initial classification of subjects 
with the Beck Depression Inventory in the mass-testing and 
their subsequent participation in the study varied from 3 
weeks to 10 weeks. The pre-manipulation mood scores were 
analyzed to confirm correct classification of subjects as 
dysphoric or nondysphoric. The results showed a strong DPRN 
effect, F (1, 128) = 31.77, a < .0001. 
Manipulation Checks 
Five measures were included to assess subjects' 
perceptions of the scenarios and to provide a basis for 
comparing the manipulation effects with previous research. 
These measures consisted of; similarity to current life 
(SIM); frequency of prior consideration (FREQ); ease of 
consideration (EASE); likelihood of actual experience 
(LIKLHD); and desirability (DESIR). The relevant means and 
standard deviations of the first four variables are 
presented in Table 1 and those for DESIR are presented 
separately in Table 2, in order to better illustrate the 
three-way interaction found for this variable. In the 
presentation of the results for these variables below, the 
results that are directly relevant to the manipulation 
effects are discussed first, followed by general results. 
Table 1 
Means / (Standard Deviations) of Manipulation Check 
Variables 
Level of 
Depressi on 
( + ) 
Outcome 
Prox Dist 
(—) 
Outcome 
Prox Dist 
Similarity 
Nondep 6.88 
(2.07) 
Dep 6.67 
(1.95) 
Frequency 
Nondep 5.69 
( 2 . 0 6 )  
Dep 5.67 
(2.35) 
4.71 [5.87] 
(2.67) 
4.47 [5.44] 
(2.93) 
5.21 [5.47] 
(2.29) 
3.68 [4.56] 
(2.69) 
3.65 1.75 [2.73] 
( 2 . 8 1 )  ( 1 . 6 1 )  
4.53 4.74 [4.64] 
(3.93) (3.00) 
3.24 2.69 [2.97] 
(1.92) (1.95) 
4.24 3.95 [4.08] 
(2.36) (2.84) 
Ease 
Nondep 7.56 
(1.71) 
Dep 
Likelihood 
7.87 
(1.41) 
Nondep 7.25 
(2.32) 
Dep 7.33 
(1.88) 
7.50 [7.53] 
(1.29) 
6.47 [7.09] 
(2.37) 
7.86 [7.53] 
(1.41) 
7.53 [7.44] 
(1.57) 
5.00 3.63 [4.33] 
(2.96) (1.60) 
5.29 5.21 [5.25] 
(2.89) (3.07) 
4.00 3.25 [3.64] 
(2.67) (1.84) 
4.53 4.84 [4.69] 
(2.45) (2.50) 
Note: DPRN X OUTCM marginals are given in C ] brackets. 
MANOVA. The manipulation check variables were analyzed 
collectively with a MANOVA procedure to examine overall 
effects and to justify additional univariate analyses. The 
averaged F-test was significant for the following effects: 
the DPRN X PRQX X OUTCM interaction, F(5, 620) = 2.58, g. < 
.05; the DPRN X OUTCM interaction, F(5, 620) = 3.45, e. = 
.009; the OUTCM factor, F(5, 620) = 62.55, g. < .01. The 
univariate results are presented below. 
SIM. Consistent with the intended manipulation, the 
ANOVA for this variable showed a significant main effect for 
PROX F<1, 128) = 10.76, p. = .004, indicating that subjects 
judged proximal scenarios to be more similar to their 
current experience than the distal scenarios. A main effect 
was also found for OUTCM F(l, 128) = 19.79, p < .001, with 
positive outcomes being judged as more similar than negative 
outcomes. This effect was qualified by a significant DPRN X 
OUTCM interaction, F(l, 128) = 5.45, a = .02, which showed 
that nondepressed subjects considered positive outcomes more 
similar than negative outcomes, t(128) = 4.58, g. < .001, 
while depressed subject did not judge the positive and 
negative outcomes to be significantly different, t(128) = 
1.24, g. = .35. 
FREQ. A PROX main effect, F<1, 128) = 4.05, p. = .04, 
was found for this variable indicating that, as intended by 
the manipulation, proximal scenarios had been considered 
more frequently in the past than distal scenarios. Also, 
positive outcomes had been more frequently considered than 
negative outcomes, as indicated by a main effect for OUTCM, 
F<1, 128) = 14.04, g = .0005. This interaction was 
qualified by a significant DPRN X OUTCM interaction, F (1, 
128) = 5.42, g_ = .02, which indicated that nondepressed 
subjects had considered scenarios with positive outcomes 
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more frequently than those with negative outcomes, t(128) = 
4.18, = .0002, while this difference did not show up for 
depressed subjects, t (128) = .84, = .41. 
EASE. A main effect was found for OUTCM only, F(l, 
128) = 39.91, g < .0001, indicating that both depressed and 
nondepressed subjects reported that the positive outcome 
scenarios were easier to imagine than negative outcome 
scenarios, regardless of future proximity. 
LIKLHD. This ANOVA also showed only an OUTCM main 
effect, F<1, 128) = 77.12, g. < .0001, with both depressed 
and nondepressed subjects judging scenarios with positive 
outcomes more likely to actually occur than those with 
negative outcomes, regardless of proximity in the future. 
DESIR. The means and standard deviations for this 
variable are presented in Table 2 (please note that this 
table is structured differently than Table 1 to more clearly 
reflect the interaction effects). A main effect was found 
for OUTCM< F(l, 128) = 197.51, g. < .0001, reflecting a 
strong judgement of scenarios with positive outcomes as more 
desirable than scenarios with negative outcomes, consistent 
with the intended manipulation effect. 
The three-way interaction (DPRN X PROX X OUTCM) was 
also significant for the DESIR variable, F(l, 128) = 7.88, g 
= .005. A PROX X OUTCM interaction was found among 
nondepressed subjects showing more extreme scores for 
positive versus negative outcomes in the distal versus 
proximal condition, F(62) = 6.35, g. = .01, suggesting that 
nondepressed subjects were more certain in their judgments 
about the desirability of outcomes in the distal future than 
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in the proximal future. Although this pattern of scores is 
reversed -for depressed subjects, with scores being more 
extreme in the proximal condition than the distal condition, 
this interaction did not approach statistical significance 
(Q. = . 14) . 
Table 2 
Means / (Standard Deviations) of the 
Desirability Single Item Measure 
Proximal Distal 
Level of (+) (-) < + ) (-) 
Depression Outcome Outcome Outcome Outcome 
Nondep 6.88 2.71 8.42 1.56 
(2.78) (2.82) (0.76) (0.99) 
Dep 7.40 1.59 6.68 2.42 
(1.88) (0.87) (2.71) (2.48) 
Looked at differently, the positive outcome scenarios 
show a tendency to be judged by nondepressed subjects as 
more desirable in the distal future than in the proximal 
future, while depressed subjects tended instead to rate 
proximal, positive scenarios as somewhat more desirable than 
the distal, positive scenarios, although neither of these 
differences was statistically significant (g. = .05, and = 
.13, respectively). 
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Recal1 
Recall means and standard deviations are presented in 
Table 3. Please note that scores in this table are 
expressed as a proportion of the total number of items. 
Table 3 
Means/ (Standard Deviations) for Recall of Standard 
Scenario Details 
Proximal Distal 
Level of (+) (—) (+) (—) 
Depression Outcome Outcome Outcome Outcome 
Nondep .67 .75 [.71] .68 .76 [.73] 
(.23) (.16) (.15) (.14) 
Dep .82 .90 [.863 .71 .75 [.73] 
(.15) (.10) (.13) (.17) 
Note: Means are expressed as proportions of possible 
correct responses. 
Note: DPRN X PROX marginals are presented in [ ] brackets. 
Repeated measures. In order to examine the within-
subjects difference in level of recall between the standard 
and self-generated information, the results were first 
analyzed in a repeated measures ANOVA. This type of recall 
(TYPE) effect, F(l, 128) = 192.08, q_ < .001, showed that 
there was a significant within-subjects difference in 
responses to the two recall components^. Examination of the 
means in Table 3 reveals that recall of the self-generated 
details was consistently better than recall of standard 
details. In fact, the recall scores for self-generated 
details are high enough to suggest a ceiling effect, given 
that 1.0 was the maximum possible score, and observed means 
ranged from .35 to .98 with an overall mean of .94. Because 
of the strong TYPE effect of the repeated measures analysis, 
and the probable ceiling effect for the self-generated 
recall measure, only standard information recall results 
will be reported below^. 
Standard information recall. The DPRN X PROX X OUTCM 
ANOVA for recall of standard information showed significant 
main effects for all three independent variables. The OUTCM 
main effect, F(l, 128) = 5.42, = .02, reflects better 
recall for information in scenarios with negative outcomes 
than those with positive outcomes. The DPRN main effect, 
F<1, 128) = 8.56, B. = .004, reflected a higher overall level 
of recall by the depressed subjects than the nondepressed 
subjects. The PROX main effect, F(l, 128) = 4.86, g. = .03, 
reflects a higher overall level of recall in the proximal 
than the distal condition. Both of these main effects, 
however, appear to be qualified by the DPRN X PROX 
interaction, F(l, 128) = 6.89, = .01, due to the 
significant elevation of the mean for the depressed subjects 
in the proximal condition relative to the other three cells. 
Specifically, the depressed, proximal mean was greater than 
that of the depressed, distal condition, t(128) = 3.55, = 
.0009, as well as the nondepressed, proximal condition, 
it (128) =3.91, = .0004, and the nondepressed, distal 
condition, t(128) = 3.62, a = .0007. No such difference is 
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•found between the proximal and distal conditions for 
nondepressed subjects, t(128) = .32, g. = .75; or between 
depressed and nondepressed subjects in the distal condition, 
t/128) = .15, = .85. The remaining interactions were 
nonsignificant, with £ levels greater than .70. 
Recall Hypotheses 
Planned comparisons on the recall hypotheses tested the 
general prediction that an expectancy-inconsistent bias 
would be exhibited when subjects were presented with 
information related to possible outcomes in a behavioral 
domain without a wel1-developed expectancy. The first two 
specific hypotheses predict this bias to be evident when 
recall for positive and negative outcome information is 
compared within the distal condition. 
Hypothesis # 1; Depressed, distal recall. Depressed 
subjects were predicted to show better recall in the distal, 
positive outcome than in the distal, negative outcome 
condition. This planned comparison was not significant, 
t(128) = .69, e. = .50, failing to support this hypothesis. 
Hypothesis # 2; Nondepressed. distal recall. 
Nondepressed subjects were predicted to show better recall 
in the distal, negative outcome than in the distal, positive 
outcome condition. This planned comparison was not 
significant, t(128) = 1.24, & = .22, also failing to support 
the expectancy-inconsistent bias expected in the distal 
condition. 
The next two hypotheses test the expectancy-
inconsistent bias by comparing the recall for expectancy-
inconsistent outcome information in the proximal and distal 
conditions. 
Hypothesis # 3; Depressed, positive recall. Depressed 
subjects in the distal, positive condition were predicted to 
recall details better than depressed subjects in the 
proximal, positive condition. This planned comparison was 
significant, t(128) = 2.07, = .05, but in the opposite 
direction than predicted. In other words, depressed 
subjects showed better recall in the proximal, positive 
condition than in the distal, positive condition. 
Hypothesis # 4: Nondepressed. negative recall. 
Nondepressed subjects in the distal, negative condition were 
predicted to recall details better than depressed subjects 
in the proximal, negative condition. This planned 
comparison was nonsignificant, t(128) = -.19, g. = .83, also 
failing to support the predicted bias for expectancy-
inconsistent possible outcomes in the distal versus the 
proximal condition. 
Mood 
The effect of the manipulation on mood was examined 
using a 2 X 2 X 2 (DPRN X PROX X OUTCM) analysis of 
covariance, with the pre-manipulation mood measure (AFFECT) 
as the covariate. The adjusted means are presented in Table 
4. A significant main effect was found for OUTCM, F(l, 128) 
= 30.25, g. < .001, with mood scores being more negative 
following exposure to scenarios with negative outcomes than 
positive outcomes. The remaining effects were 
nonsignificant, with q. levels greater than .10. 
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Table 4 
Means for the Post-Manipulation Mood Measure. Adjusted for 
Pre-manipulation Mood Scores 
Proximal Distal 
Level of ( + ) (—) ( + ) <-) 
Depression Outcome Outcome Outcome Outcome 
Nondep 94.99 82.54 92.04 72.71 
Dep 87.66 75.47 87.14 74.82 
Mood Hypotheses 
Planned comparisons were performed on the adjusted 
means to test the stated hypotheses. 
Hypothesis # 5; Depressed, positive mood contrast. 
Depressed subjects were predicted to show a more positive 
mood in the distal, positive condition than in the proximal, 
positive condition. The planned comparison of these two 
cells (Ms = 87.14 and 87.66, respectively) was 
nonsignificant, t<128) = .86, g. > .05). 
Hypothesis # 6: Nondepressed. negative mood contrast. 
Nondepressed subjects were expected to show greater negative 
mood change in the distal, negative condition than in the 
proximal, negative condition. The planned comparison of 
these two cell means (Ms = 72.71 and 82.54, respectively) 
showed a significant effect, t (128) = -1.93, = .05. 
Self-Focus 
State self-focus (SSF) scores were analyzed with a DPRN 
X PROX X OUTCIi analysis of covariance procedure, using the 
dispositional measure of self-focus (PSC) obtained in the 
subject screening procedure as the covariate. Adjusted 
means for the state self-focus measure are presented in 
Table 5. The ANCOVA for SSF found a main effect for PROX, 
F(l, 128) = 4.72, B. = .03, with scores being higher in the 
distal condition than the proximal condition. The remaining 
effects were nonsignificant, although the DPRN X PROX 
interaction, F(l, 128) = 3.49, = .06, approached 
significance. State self-focus appears to be higher for the 
depressed subjects than the nondepressed subjects only in 
the distal condition (p. = .04), whereas the difference 
between depressed and nondepressed self-focus in not 
significant in the proximal condition. The remaining 
effects were nonsignificant, with all p. > .30. 
Self-Focus Hypotheses 
Hypothesis # 7; Nondepressed. negative self-focus. 
Self-focus by nondepressed subjects when considering 
negative outcomes was predicted to be greater in the distal 
than the proximal condition. This hypothesis was not 
supported as the difference between these cell means was not 
significant (p. = .86). 
Hypothesis # 8: Depressed, positive self-focus. It 
was predicted that self-focus by depressed individuals when 
considering positive scenarios would be higher in the distal 
than the proximal condition. This hypothesis was confirmed, 
^ ( 128 ) — 2. 14, B.— • U4. 
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Table 5 
Means of State Self-Focus Scores. Adjusted for Dispositional 
Self-Focus 
Proximal Distal 
Depression (+) (—) (+) (—) 
Level Outcome Outcome Outcome Outcome 
Nondep 31.85 31.79 [31.82] 31.48 32.89 [32.18] 
Dep 29.63 30.94 [30.293 34.48 35.62 [35.053 
Note: Scores based on a scale of 10 - 50, with higher 
scores representing greater self-focus. 
Note: DPRN X PROX marginals are presented in [ 3 brackets. 
Correlations 
The relationships among the primary dependent variables 
(RCLSTD, MOOD, SSF) were examined to help interpret the 
ANOVA results. Of particular interest was the relationship 
between state self-focus and recall, given the finding that 
recall appeared to be better in the depressed, proximal 
cell, which also showed the lowest state self—focus scores. 
The relationship between state self-focus and mood change 
was also examined in light of the possible relationship 
between these two variables, as suggested by the literature 
(Pyszczynski, Holt, & Greenberg, 1987). The correlation 
matrices are presented in Table 6. 
Table 6 
Intercorrelations of Dependent Variables 
MOOD SSF MOOD SSF 
RCLSTD 
MOOD 
RCLSTD 
MOOD 
RCLSTD 
MOOD 
RCLSTD 
MOOD 
RCLSTD 
MOOD 
Full sample 
,14 -.05 
- . 1 1  
Nondepressed 
20 .05 
.27* 
Proximal 
—.16 —.04 
— .  1 6  
Nondepressed, Proximal 
-.17 -.05 
Depressed, Proximal 
- .12 .02 
04 
Depressed 
- .11 -.21 
.02  
Distal 
-.15 .01 
-. lO 
Nondepressed, Distal 
— .25 .22 
-.34 
Depressed, Distal 
—.06 —.16 
.04 
Di scussion 
Analyses of the results for the three main dependent 
variables of this study (recall, mood and self-focus) showed 
little evidence of the predicted cognitive processing bias 
for expectancy-incongruent information in distal future 
scenarios relative to proximal future scenarios. Planned 
comparisons showed that only two of the eight specific 
hypotheses were supported. 
The recall results showed a strong bias for negative 
information in all conditions rather than the predicted bias 
for positive information in the depressed, distal, and the 
nondepressed, proximal, conditions. The mood results 
indicated that depressed subjects showed almost identical 
mood responses to the proximal and distal scenarios, which 
also contradicts the predicted reversal of processing bias 
for the distal scenarios. Nondepressed subjects did show 
the predicted elevation in negative mood in the distal, 
relative to the proximal condition, although this result 
suggested a weakening, rather than a reversal, of the 
expectancy-congruent bias. The self-focus results for 
depressed subjects showed the predicted elevated self-focus 
in the distal, positive condition relative to the proximal, 
positive condition, although this result was qualified by a 
strong proximity effect. Results for nondepressed subjects 
showed no self-focus differences across the proximity or 
outcome valence factors, contradictory to the prediction of 
elevated self-focus in the distal, negative condition. 
Possible explanations for these results are discussed 
first in general terms, and then by addressing the specific 
5:1 
findings for each of the dependent variables. Discussions 
of theoretical and practical implications, and directions 
for future research then follow. 
Effectiveness of the Experimental Manipulation 
The experimental manipulation in this study was based 
on two basic assumptions: 1) that the positive and negative 
possible outcomes of the scenarios would elicit the same or 
similar cognitive reactions as the success and failure 
feedback strategies employed in other research paradigms; 
and 2) that scenarios set in the proximal future (2 months) 
would be subject to wel1-developed outcome expectancies, 
whereas scenarios set in the distal future would be subject 
only to poorly-developed expectancies. The lack of support 
found for the hypotheses must first be examined in light of 
these assumptions to determine whether the hypotheses were 
in fact put to a sufficient test to provide disconfirmation. 
Outcome valence assumption. Previous research on the 
cognitive processing of positive and negative information 
has typically presented subjects with outcomes related to 
their performance on a task, thereby providing them with 
information about their present state or ability (cf. 
Pyszczynski, Hamilton, Herring & Greenberg, 1989). The 
information provided to subjects in the present study 
reflected positive or negative outcomes that might be 
experienced in the future, and it was assumed that this type 
of feedback would be processed in the same way as 
information related to the present. 
Ratings of the positive and negative scenarios on the 
SIM and FRED variables indicated modest support for the 
outcome valence assumption. Nondepressed subjects rated 
positive outcomes as more similar to their current life, and 
as being more frequently considered than negative outcomes, 
whereas depressed subjects rated positive and negative 
outcomes as equal on these two variables. The findings 
regarding the optimistic bias of nondepressed individuals is 
consistent with previous research (Weinstein, 1980), whereas 
the findings for depressed subjects are consistent with 
research that has found depressed individuals to be more 
pessimistic than nondepressed individuals. The findings 
support the "depressive realism" or "even handedness" 
reported in several studies of depressed individuals (cf. 
Alloy & Abramson, 1988). According to this view, depressed 
individuals are less biased in their appraisal of reality 
than nondepressed individuals, and therefore are more aware 
of negative aspects of their lives. Ratings of positive and 
negative outcomes as equal in terms of similarity and 
frequency of prior consideration are consistent with this 
view. 
Ratings of the EASE and LIKLHD variables did not 
support the assumption regarding the outcome valence. The 
finding that positive outcomes were rated as easier to 
imagine than negative outcomes by depressed subjects is 
inconsistent with accessibility theory and research (Higgins 
& Bargh, 1987; Segal, 1988) which suggests that depressed 
individuals should find negative outcomes easier to imagine 
than positive outcomes. The finding that positive outcomes 
were judged as more likely to actually occur than negative 
outcomes by both nondepressed and depressed subjects 
supports findings about the optimistic bias of nondepressed 
individuals, but is contradictory to the lack of such 
optimism found for depressed individuals (e.g. Pietromonaco 
& Markus, 1985; Pyszczynski, Holt & Greenberg, 1987). Thus 
both of these measures failed to support the assumption that 
positive and negative possible selves elicit the same 
cognitive responses as the immediate feedback tactics 
utilized in previous research. 
The lack of solid support for the crucial outcome 
valence assumption suggests that the outcome factor did not 
have the intended effect. An alternative explanation would 
be that the positive and negative scenarios failed to 
produce outcome effects because their wording was not 
sufficiently different, although this explanation is 
contradicted by the strong outcome effects found for recall 
and mood. Because the predicted expectancy-consistent 
biases were not confirmed, conclusions about the presence or 
absence of the predicted expectancy-inconsistent biases are 
necessarily limited. 
Proximity assumption. The assumption regarding the 
distinct perception of scenarios based on their proximity 
was generally supported. Ratings of the SIM and FREQ 
variables suggest that scenarios set in the proximal future 
were judged more similar to current life, and more 
frequently considered, than scenarios set in the distal 
future. These findings strongly suggest that well-
developed expectancies existed only for proximal scenarios 
since differences in amount of experience, familiarity, and 
consideration have been shown to reflect differences in the 
development of expectancies (Higgins & Bargh, 1987). This 
assumption as it relates to the triggering of an impression-
formation cognitive processing response is discussed below 
in terms of the dependent variables. 
Recal1 
Recall hypotheses. A reversal of the expectancy-
consistent recall bias did not occur in the distal condition 
as predicted (hypotheses 1 and 2). This result does not 
support the tenet that information about a possible self in 
the distant future is subject to the same expectancy-
inconsistent cognitive bias as shown to occur during 
impression-formation. Whereas this effect has been hound 
previously when individuals were asked to consider current 
information about an unfamiliar experience or individual, it 
was not found in the present study which asked subjects to 
consider information about what might happen to themselves 
in the unfamiliar (distant) future. 
As discussed above, the lack of evidence for an 
expectancy-consistency bias in the proximal condition limits 
the conclusions that can be drawn regarding the 
susceptibility of developing possible selves to an 
expectancy-inconsistent bias. A true test of this 
hypothesis may have shown the same result, however. 
Although the distal possible selves were in the seldom-
considered future and were considered dissimilar to the 
current self, the expectancy for the self in these scenarios 
may have been sufficiently developed to prevent an 
impression-formation response. It may be that possible 
selves set in a previously unconsidered, yet anticipated 
behavior domain (such as parenting) are subject to the same 
cognitive biases as current behavioral domains due to the 
effects of early anticipatory socialization on expectancy 
development. 
The likelihood results show that subjects did not 
distinguish between proximal and distal scenarios in their 
anticipation of actual outcomes. Distal, positive scenarios 
were judged just as likely to actually occur as proximal, 
positive scenarios, and negative distal and proximal 
scenarios were considered equally unlikely to occur. Also 
consistent with the lack of distinction between proximal and 
distal expectancy development was the absence of the 
predicted recall difference between proximal and distal 
scenarios (hypotheses 3 and 4). This suggests that the 
unfamiliar (distal) possible selves were subject to the same 
recall biases as familiar (proximal) possible selves. 
Perhaps the domain of the self-concept is so well developed 
and sufficiently unique in its structure and accessibility 
that all self-related information is within the grasp of the 
same memory processing biases. 
The failure of these four hypotheses appears to be due 
to a strong bias resulting in uniformly better recall for 
information from negative outcome scenarios for all 
conditions. This result is inconsistent with extensive 
research showing recall to reflect a mood-congruent bias 
(Blaney, 1986), with depressed individuals biased toward 
recalling less positive and more negative information than 
nondepressed individuals. This, again, is an indication of 
the failure of this study to reproduce the expectancy-
consistent biases in the proximal condition. One possible 
explanation of these results is that level of arousal may 
account for the overall negative recall bias, as illustrated 
in a recent series of studies by Reisberg, Heuer, McLean & 
O'Shaughnessy (1988). They found a strong association 
between the vividness of memories for experiences and the 
strength of the affect related to those memories, while no 
association was found between memory vividness and the 
valence of the related affect. . The degree of overall 
arousal produced by the affect, regardless of valence was 
deemed responsible for heightened encoding of detail. 
Following from this research, it is possible that the 
better recall of the negative scenarios in this study may 
have been due to a higher level of arousal as a result of 
these scenarios, relative to the positive scenarios. Since 
heightened arousal has been shown to intensify affective 
responses (Zillmann, 1978; Clark, 1982), one possible 
indicator of emotional arousal in this study is the degree 
of mood change resulting from exposure to the scenarios. 
Examination of the pre- and post-manipulation mood change 
scores reveals that negative scenarios did not produce a 
greater mood change than positive scenarios. Positive 
scenarios produced an overall positive change of +9.25 in 
mood scores, averaged across the DPRN and PROX factors, 
while negative scenarios produced a negative mood change of 
-4.73 in mood scores averaged across DPRN and PROX factors. 
This finding contradicts the arousal explanation, although 
it cannot be ruled out based only on this indirect indicator 
of arousal. 
Perhaps the nature of the scenarios themselves provides 
the most reasonable accounting of these results. As Markus 
and Nurius (1986) point out, possible selves are important 
because "they function as incentives for future behavior 
(i.e. they are selves to be approached or avoided)" (p. 
955). The desirability measure indicates that depressed and 
nondepressed subjects were similar in their view of the 
positive and negative scenarios as outcomes to strive for 
and to avoid, respectively. It may have been that the 
threatening aspects of the negative possible selves were 
more powerful for both depressed and nondepressed subjects 
than the goals represented by the positive possible selves, 
causing subjects to attend to and process information 
related to the negative more extensively than the positive 
possible selves. This interpretation of the results is 
supported by the finding that nondepressed subjects reacted 
to negative scenarios with a significant decrease in mood in 
the distal relative to the proximal condition, whereas 
positive scenarios failed to produce this pattern in the 
mood scores of depressed subjects. The difference between 
the threatening implications of negative possible selves and 
the goal-attainment quality of positive possible selves may 
be ultimately responsible for the observed discrepancies in 
their ease of recall. 
Depressive myopia. An unexpected and surprising recall 
finding was the relatively high level of recall exhibited by 
depressed subjects in the proximal condition. The finding 
that these subjects showed significantly better recall than 
subjects in the depressed, distal and the nondepressed 
proximal and distal conditions suggests a type of 
shortsightedness by depressed individuals in processing 
information about their future. It may be that depressed 
individuals prefer to focus on possible outcomes in the 
near, more familiar, future, rather than consider the 
possibilities that lie in the relatively unfamiliar distant 
future. Cognitive theories of depression (Beck, 1967, 
1976), and research on cognitions of depressives (e.g.. Beck 
Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974) point to the pessimistic 
view depressed individuals have of their future. This 
suggests a type of ongoing vigilance of what negative event 
might befall them next, and what effect it may have on their 
lives. Viewed in this light, depressed subjects in this 
study may have considered proximal future scenarios as 
particularly relevant to their sense of well-being, and 
therefore attended to them more than to distal scenarios. 
This may have resulted in heightened processing and hence 
better recall of proximal scenarios. Distant future 
scenarios, in contrast, represent possible outcomes which do 
not pose an immediate threat, and are thus not as relevant 
to the depressed individual. 
Two other findings of this study lend credence to this 
conclusion. The three-way interaction found in the analysis 
of the desirability measure showed that in comparison with 
nondepressed subjects, depressed subjects tended to make 
more extreme desirability ratings of the proximal scenarios 
than the distal scenarios. This suggests that while 
nondepressed subjects expressed more certainty in their 
judgments of the distal relative to the proximal future, 
this pattern was reversed for depressed subjects. 
Additional support of this shortsightedness, or depressive 
myopia, is suggested by the finding of decreased state self-
focus by depressed subjects in the proximal condition 
relative to the distal condition, while no such difference 
was found for nondepressed subjects. These results suggest 
that attention to information in the proximal scenarios drew 
the attention of the depressed subjects away from 
themselves, thus decreasing state self-focus. In contrast, 
self-focus in the distal scenarios was higher for depressed 
subjects than nondepressed subjects, consistent with 
previous research in this area (Ingram, Lumry, Cruet, & 
Sieber, 1987; Smith, Ingram, & Roth, 1985). 
This argument is also supported by previous research on 
the delay of gratification and punishment by depressed 
individuals. Several studies have found that depressed mood 
in children is related to a focus on immediate gratification 
(e.g. Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zeiss, 1972; Schwarz & Pollack, 
1977). Similarly, Wertheim and Schwarz (1983) found that 
depressed individuals tended to choose to delay punishment 
rather than get it over with immediately, even though this 
choice resulted in a higher overall negative impact of the 
punishment. They concluded that depressives are primarily 
interested in preventing their current negative emotional 
state from worsening, resulting in an increased salience of 
current outcomes relevant to future outcomes. This is 
consistent with findings in the present study suggesting 
that proximal scenarios receive a higher level of cognitive 
processing than those in the distal future. 
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The depressive myopia -finding may be relevant to 
cognitive theories of depression. Beck (1976), for example, 
points to the central role that pessimism plays in the 
maintenance of depression. The current results provide an 
indication of the range of this pessimism, suggesting that 
the narrow focus of the depressed individual's views may 
keep attention to the near future, possibly because it is 
more salient to that individual's current sense of well-
being. There are indications also that nondepressed 
individuals show the opposite tendency. The distant future 
may gain more of their attention, presumably because their 
optimism allows them to take the outcomes in the near future 
for granted. 
Mood 
Depressed subjects showed a strong reaction to the 
outcome valence of the scenarios, although they did not 
respond to the proximity aspects, instead showing similar 
responses in both the proximal and distal conditions. As 
was found for the recall variable, this finding does not 
support the expectancy-consistent bias previously found for 
the processing of information by depressed individuals 
(Beck, 1986; Pyszczynski, Holt, & Greenberg, 1987). In 
other words, depressed subjects showed cognitive processing 
of expectancy-inconsistent (i.e. optimistic) information not 
only in the distal scenarios, as hypothesized, but also in 
the proximal scenarios. 
Again, the unpredicted mood results appear most likely 
attributable to the future—oriented nature of the feedback 
utilized in the experimental manipulation. As discussed 
above, these subjects may have reacted to the potential 
threats and successes represented by the positive and 
negative possible selves in a different manner than has been 
found for subjects given immediate success or failure 
feedback. Subjects were asked to consider scenarios that 
presented the possibility of either significant failure or 
success in an important social encounter. The finding that 
the positive and negative scenarios produced corresponding 
positive and negative changes in mood in all conditions 
indicates how powerful possible selves are for the 
manipulation of mood. 
Findings for nondepressed subjects supported the 
predicted increase in cognitive processing of expectancy-
inconsistent information in the distal relative to the 
proximal condition, although there was no evidence of the 
predicted reversal of the expectancy-consistent bias in the 
distal condition. The significant difference in negative 
mood scores between the distal and proximal conditions by 
nondepressed subjects suggests that information about 
expectancy-inconsistent (i.e. pessimistic) possible selves 
received more extensive processing in the distal than the 
proximal scenarios, apparently due to a weakening of the 
nondepressive optimistic bias. 
This mood finding for nondepressed subjects supports 
the contention that information about one's possible 
outcomes in the distal future is less susceptible to 
expectancy-consistent bias, presumably due to the lack of a 
well-developed expectancy for possible selves in the distal 
•future. There is no evidence, however, that processing by 
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nondepressed subjects was biased in favor of expectancy-
inconsistent (i.e. pessimistic) information in the distal 
scenarios. Thus, even though the expectancy-consistent bias 
appears to have weakened in the distal condition, there is 
no support for the hypothesis that the processing of 
possible selves in the distal future resembles the bias 
toward expectancy-inconsistent information that occurs 
during impression formation. 
The confirmation of the mood hypothesis for 
nondepressed subjects but not depressed subjects may be 
related to overall differences in responses to the positive 
and negative scenarios. Since the mood hypothesis for 
nondepressed subjects relied on reactions to negative 
scenarios, and since the recall findings suggest that 
negative scenarios generally received more extensive 
processing than positive scenarios, it appears likely that 
the mood results were due to the extent of processing of the 
negative as opposed to the positive scenarios. These 
results indicate that the bias of nondepressed subjects 
against processing expectancy-inconsistent (i.e. 
pessimistic) information was not as strong when the 
information represented the relatively distal future. This 
may have been due to the relative lack of expectancies for 
outcomes in anticipated roles in the distal future which 
would have increased receptiveness to novel, expectancy-
inconsistent information. 
An alternative explanation is that the more elaborate 
processing of the negative scenarios was due to something 
other than outcome valence, such as differences in the 
wording or situations of the proximal and distal scenarios. 
For example, nondepressed subjects may have reported more 
negative mood in response to negative outcomes in the distal 
than the proximal condition simply because the negative 
outcome in the distal scenario might have been perceived as 
a more serious -failure. The lack o-f similar proximity 
effects for positive outcomes argues against this 
explanation, however, since the positive outcome in the 
distal scenarios should have been seen as significantly more 
positive than the proximal scenarios, and therefore produced 
differences in positive mood. 
Overall, the mood results indicate that exposure to the 
scenarios in this study produced a significant positive or 
negative mood change for both nondepressed and depressed 
subjects that was consistent with the outcome valence of the 
scenario. It is interesting to note that these mood changes 
occurred for negative possible selves even though these 
outcomes were judged unlikely to actually occur by both 
depressed and nondepressed subjects. The mood results also 
provide evidence of a weakening of the expectancy-consistent 
bias in nondepressed subjects when they consider the distal 
future, suggesting that expectancy-inconsistent information 
receives more extensive processing when it is related to 
relatively unfamiliar as opposed to familiar behavior 
domains. This effect was observed only when the expectancy-
inconsistent information received generally higher 
processing, however, hence the confirmed prediction for 
nondepressed but not depressed subjects due to relatively 
higher processing of negative scenarios. The results 
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generally indicate that possible selves are linked closely 
to an individual's current mood, and provide further support 
•for the self-concept model developed by Hazel markus and her 
colleagues (Markus & Wurf, 1987; Markus & Nurius, 1986; 
Markus & Kunda, 1986), particularly regarding the influence 
of possible selves on affect. 
Self-focus 
Contrary to the predicted result, the valence of the 
scenario outcomes had no effect on the state self-focus of 
either the depressed or nondepressed subjects. The level of 
self-focus shown by nondepressed subjects was consistent 
across the proximity and outcome valence factors. This 
finding is different from the findings of previous studies 
(Pyszczynski et al., 1987) which have found that the self-
focus of nondepressed individuals increases following 
exposure to success feedback. Depressed subjects showed the 
predicted higher level of self-focusing in the distal than 
the proximal condition when considering positive outcome 
scenarios. This appears, however, to be due primarily to 
the significantly higher self-focus by depressed subjects in 
the distal condition than the proximal condition, regardless 
of outcome valence. This lack of response to the positive 
and negative outcomes in the scenarios is inconsistent with 
research showing that depressives engage in higher levels of 
self-focus following failure experiences (e.g. Greenberg & 
Pyszczynski, 1986). This provides further support for the 
conclusion that the possible future successes and failures 
presented in this study were subject to different processing 
than the present-oriented success and failure feedback used 
in previous research. 
The self-focus results discussed above in conjunction 
with the recall and mood results suggest a relationship 
between state self-focus and cognitive processing such that 
lower state self-focus is associated with more extensive 
processing, leading to better recall. This is suggested by 
the finding that depressed subjects in the proximal 
condition showed both lower state self-focus and relatively 
better recall than in the distal condition. The finding 
that the self-focus of the depressed subjects in the distal 
condition is higher than the depressed, proximal as well as 
the overall self-focus levels of nondepressed subjects is 
consistent with previous findings that depressed individuals 
exhibit higher levels of self-focus than nondepressed 
individuals (Ingram, Lumry, Cruet, & Sieber, 1987; Smith, 
Ingram, & Roth, 1985). This further supports the 
interpretation that the lower self-focus in the depressed, 
proximal condition is due to processing of the scenario. 
The relationship between state self-focus and recall by 
depressed subjects is, however, only marginally supported by 
a correlation of -.21 (& = .08). Thus, while it appears 
reasonable that the processing of the proximal scenarios by 
depressed subjects counteracted their natural tendency to 
engage in higher levels of self-focus, presumably by drawing 
their attention away from themselves, this conclusion is 
only modestly supported. 
To summarize, the results of this study did not conform 
to the general predictions regarding cognitive processing 
biases. Little evidence was found of the predicted 
expectancy-consistent bias in the proximal condition, and 
only limited evidence was found for increased processing of 
expectancy-inconsistent information in the distal condition. 
The lack of support for the hypotheses of the study may have 
been due to an unsupported assumption that subjects would 
respond to positive and negative possible outcomes in the 
same way as success and failure experiences. Perhaps the 
most significant and interesting finding was the combination 
of relatively higher recall and lower self-focus by 
depressed subjects who were presented with scenarios set in 
the proximal future. This provided evidence of a type of 
depressive myopia cognitive bias for depressed individuals, 
as well as suggesting a link between their level of 
information processing and self-focus. This relationship 
received only mixed support, however. 
Practical Implications of Study 
The most significant practical aspect of this study 
relates to the use of possible self-images to bring about 
mood change in both depressed and nondepressed individuals. 
Markus and Nurius (1986) argue convincingly that positive 
and negative possible selves have powerful emotional 
effects; positive possible selves can represent one's most 
cherished hopes and dreams, while negative possible selves 
can harbor one's most dreaded fears. The results of this 
study confirm the powerful effect that information related 
to possible selves can have on emotion, regardless of the 
individual's level of depression just prior to exposure to 
the information. 
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Positive or negative expectancies for the self did not 
appear to bias the processing of expectancy-inconsistent 
possible selves. As Markus and Nurius (1986) note, possible 
selves may be more malleable and easier to change than other 
self-conceptions, due to being tied less closely to reality. 
Thus, individuals may be more willing to "try on" a possible 
outcome, even if it is inconsistent with their general 
expectancies for their future, in order to check out its 
desirability. This may provide a safe way to explore 
alternative courses of action with the risk being limited to 
a shift in mood rather than the shift in self-image that the 
experience of success or failure might necessitate. As 
such, possible selves do seem to comprise a distinct and 
valuable element of an individual's self-concept. 
These findings might be applied in practical settings 
in a number of ways. Possible self-images might be used in 
a clinical setting to produce mood changes in clients who 
exhibit either an excessively elevated or depressed mood 
state. Individuals in the midst of a hypomanic episode, for 
instance, might be exposed to negative possible selves to 
the point that their mood comes down to a level more 
congruent with their reality. Similarly, depressed 
individuals could be asked to consider positive possible 
selves, thereby elevating their mood and possibly decreasing 
other depressive symptoms such as low energy and sleep 
disturbance. Such application would correspond to cognitive 
behavioral therapy techniques such as those used by Beck 
(1967) to combat the negative view of the future which he 
includes in the depressive triad. 
The results of this study suggest that depressed 
individuals are more receptive to information about possible 
outcomes in the relatively proximal future than the distal 
future. Discussions about what might happen to them in the 
next few weeks or months appear to be more likely to gain 
their attention than focusing on long-term goals or 
predictions. Focusing on proximal possibilities also may 
have the benefit of decreasing the depressed individual's 
depressive self—focus which has been shown to lead to 
decreased pessimism (Pyszczynski, Holt & Greenberg, 1987). 
Asking depressed individuals to focus on positive possible 
selves in the distal future, on the other hand, appears 
likely to maintain their elevated self-focus, although at 
least a temporary improvement in mood may still result. 
For use outside of a clinical setting, possible selves 
could be used by individuals on their own to counteract mood 
disturbances at an early stage. Since positive and negative 
possible selves are easy to comprehend and utilize and 
apparently very responsive to self—related information, they 
may be very useful to the individual to help maintain a 
balanced mood state. Besides mood, possible selves appear 
to have a strong link to motivation and subsequent behavior. 
This can be utilized by individuals to create a sense of 
optimism or pessimism as needed. Positive possible selves 
can be used to motivate behavior that moves one toward a 
goal. Negative possible selves can likewise be used to 
motivate behavior away from the imagined outcome. Again, 
the current results suggest that while nondepressed 
individuals respond to outcomes set in the relatively distal 
future, depressed individuals respond best to possible 
outcomes in the proximal future. 
Directions for Future Research 
An essential assumption of this study was found to be 
unsupported due to what appear to be unique cognitive biases 
for information related to possible selves. Future research 
on possible selves could study the cognitive biases 
operating when individuals consider possible positive and 
negative outcomes, contrasting these with biases found in 
studies using immediate success or failure feedback. 
Because of the faulty assumption regarding the processing of 
expectancy-consistent information, the conclusions that 
could be drawn about cognitive biases for expectancy-
inconsistent information were limited. This issue could be 
addressed more effectively once the overall processing of 
information bearing on possible selves is better understood. 
The possible selves literature is still relatively 
sparse since its inception by Markus and Nurius in 1986. 
While few conclusions could be settled on as a result of the 
present research, it illustrated that individuals do react 
to information about possible selves with interesting and 
unexpected recall, mood, and self-focus responses. There 
are many different directions that future research on can 
and should pursue, such as examining how socialization 
contributes to positive and negative possible self-images in 
children, specifying the linkage between possible selves and 
motivation, and applying possible selves in clinical 
settings. Although this study used only female subjects to 
avoid gender confounds, future research could examine gender 
70 
differences in cognitions related to possible selves. Given 
the findings of gender diffences in self-focus and 
depression (Ingram et al., 1988), differences in self-focus 
cognitions appear warranted. 
The depressive myopia finding in this study suggests 
that the connection between depression and expectations for 
future outcomes continues to be an important area for future 
research. For example, the responses of depressed 
individuals to possible outcomes set at various points in 
the future could be examined to further understand how they 
view their future, and what type of positive possible selves 
would be most effective in instilling a renewed sense of 
hope for the future. Improved measures of recall and state 
self-focus could be employed in such research to produce a 
more accurate picture of the cognitive processes occurring 
under these conditions. Finally, research on the mood 
manipulation effects of possible selves should explore the 
duration of these effects, as well as the duration of other 
cognitive responses, such as changes in state self-focus. 
As Markus and Nurius suggest, future research is likely to 
show that possible selves are an important and powerful 
aspect of cognition with significant implications for affect 
and motivation. 
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Notes 
^The standard and self-generated components of the 
recall measure were analyzed with a repeated measures ANOVA, 
which revealed an OUTCM X TYPE (standard versus self-
generated) effect (F(l, 128) = 4.83, g. < .05), and a 
significant DPRN X PROX X TYPE interaction, F(l, 128) = 
17.56, < .01. Because of the ceiling effect found for the 
self-generated component, and the significant interactions 
by type of recall, the standard and self—generated 
components were analyzed separately. 
•^Analysis of the self-generated recall component 
indicated main effects for DPRN (F(l, 128) = 11.14, & < 
.005), with depressed subjects once again showing better 
recall than nondepressed subjects, and PROX (F<1, 128) = 
10.34, a < .005), with recall better in the proximal than 
the distal condition. The DPRN X PROX interaction was also 
significant for this variable (F(l, 123) = 5.11, g_ < .05), 
such that recall in the nondepressed, distal condition was 
lower than in the other conditions, which were all uniformly 
high, showing few recall errors. This effect was not 
anticipated and attempt at explaining it will be made. The 
remaining effects were nonsignificant, with > .25. 
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Appendix A 
Beck Depression Inventory 
PLEASE NOTE 
Copyrighted materials in this document have 
not been filmed at the request of the author. 
They are available for consultation, however, 
in the author's university library. 
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University Microfilms International 
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Appendix B 
Private Self-Consciousness Scale 
Please read each of the following statements and rate 
them according to how well they describe you while you were 
reading the journal entry. This is a 5 point scale with 1 
meaning definitely false and 5 meaning definitely true. 
DEFINITELY DEFINITELY 
FALSE 1 2 3 4 5 TRUE 
I am always trying to figure myself out. 
I am generally aware of myself. 
I reflect about myself alot. 
I am the subject of my own fantasy. 
I often scrutinize myself. 
I am generally attentive to my inner feelings. 
I am constantly examining my motives. 
I sometimes have the feeling that I am off 
somewhere watching myself. 
I am alert to changes in my mood. 
I am aware of the way my mind works. 
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Appendix C 
Consent Form 
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Consent Form 
The Psychology Department of Iowa State University 
supports the practice of protection of human subjects in 
research. The following information is provided so that you 
can decide whether you wish to participate in the present 
study. However, even if you agree to participate, you are 
free to withdraw at any time during the procedure without 
penalty. 
This study involves imagining yourself in a future 
situation. You will be asked to read over a situation and 
personalize it with your own details as you imagine the 
situation. You will also be asked questions about your 
feelings and thoughts. 
Your answers will be kept confidential. Your name will 
never be associated with the study or the results in any 
way. If for any reason, you feel that you wish to talk 
further on the same subject matter, Mr. Huston will be able 
to assist you or direct you to other professional services. 
Please write your name below. 
Name 
Signature Date 
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Appendix D 
Pre-manipulation mood scale 
Affect Questionnaire 
We would like to find out how you are feeling right 
now. Please place a slash mark on the line for each 
adjective below according to how you feel right now. 
Happy 
not at al1 
Discontent 
very 
not at al 1 
Insecure 
very 
not at al1 
Hopeful 
very 
not at all 
Tense 
very 
not at al1 
Joyful 
very 
not at al1 
Di scouraged 
very 
not at all 
PI eased 
very 
not at all very 
In general, how would you describe your feelings right now? 
Very positive Very Negative 
Appendix E 
Post-manipulation mood seal 
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Mood Survey 
We would like to find out what your mood is right now. 
Please indicate your current mood by putting a slash mark on 
the line for each adjective below. 
Relaxed 
not at al1 
Displeased 
very 
not at all 
Encouraged 
very 
not at all 
Sad 
very 
not at all 
Unhappy 
very 
not at all 
Hopeless 
very 
not at all 
Secure 
very 
not at all 
Content 
very 
not at al1 very 
In general, how would you describe your mood right now? 
Very positive Very Negative 
Appendix F 
Instructions for the proximal scenarios 
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On the following pages, you are presented with a description 
of the events of a weekend you might experience several 
months in the future. In this situation, you are at school 
and are entertaining a visitor from out of town (eg. friend 
or family) from noon on Saturday until Sunday afternoon. 
Some specific details of the visit are provided, and you 
will provide the remaining details where indicated so that a 
complete and clear picture is formed. Spend a few moments 
now relaxing while you imagine yourself a few months from 
now, entertaining a visitor over the weekend. 
In a few minutes, you will be provided details of this 
weekend. First, read the details of the situation that are 
provided. An account of the weekend is then presented in 
the form of a private entry in a personal journal, such as 
you might keep to remember your experiences. It may not be 
your personal style to keep a Journal, but please try to 
imagine that this is something you do in the following 
situation. 
The entry has been written in a general way, and may be 
slightly different than the way you imagine yourself 
experiencing it and writing about it. For this reason, 
blanks have been left in several places so that you can 
personalize the journal entry according to your own mental 
image of what you think you would experience and to reflect 
your own writing style. 
After you have filled in these blanks, please read the 
entry over again, trying to picture yourself in the 
situation, and complete the questionnaires that follow. 
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Appendix G 
Instructions for the distal scenarios 
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On the -following pages, you are presented with a description 
of the events of a weekend you might experience in the 
distant future. Imagine yourself as a mother approximately 
25 years from now. Your young adult son or daughter comes 
home from college to spend part of the weekend with you 
while your husband is out of town on a business trip. Some 
specific details of the visit are provided, and you will 
provide the remaining details where indicated so that a 
complete and clear picture is formed. Spend a few moments 
now relaxing while you imagine yourself in the distant 
future, entertaining your son or daughter over the weekend. 
In a few minutes, you will be provided details of this 
weekend. First, read the details of the situation that are 
provided. An account of the weekend is then presented in 
the form of a private entry in a personal journal, such as 
you might keep to remember your experiences. It may not be 
your personal style to keep a journal, but please try to 
imagine that this is something you do in the following 
situation. 
The entry has been written in a general way, and may be 
slightly different than the way you imagine yourself 
experiencing it and writing about it. For this reason, 
blanks have been left in several places so that you can 
personalize the journal entry according to your own mental 
image of what you think you would experience and to reflect 
your own writing style. 
After you have filled in these blanks, please read the 
entry over again, trying to picture yourself in the 
situation, and complete the questionnaires that follow. 
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Appendix H 
Proximal, positive scenario 
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Allow yourself to relax as you carefully read the 
description and journal entry below. As you read, begin to 
mentally experience the situations using all of your senses. 
Imagine not only the sights and sounds, but also the 
sensations of touch, smell and taste that go along with the 
situations. Afterwards, take a few moments to close your 
eyes and allow yourself to get into the description as much 
as possible before going on to the next step. 
General description: Imagine yourself sitting in your 
bedroom alone at school on a Sunday evening a few months 
from now. You can hear the wind blowing and you are glad to 
be inside away from the cold. You sit back and relax after 
studying for a while. Your thoughts drift back to the 
weekend you just spent with your (mother, 
father, brother, sister, other relative, or high school 
friend). He/She left for home a this afternoon after 
visiting you at school. 
You take out the small notebook where you have been 
keeping notes about some of your memorable college 
experiences (both good and bad). You pick up your pen and 
get comfortable, and then begin writing your latest entry. 
Imagine that you make the following entry. Go slowly and 
pause to imagine yourself in the situations described. Then 
fill in the blanks with details as you imagine them. 
Date: , 19 
left for home this afternoon at 3:00 
after spending the weekend. He/She got here Saturday at 
noon. I hadn't seen him/her since . 
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I arranged to spent Sat. afternoon at the 
(museum, ballgame, mall, park, etc.) together, where we had 
a great time because . 
After that, we got seated right away at a nice Oriental 
restaurant where I had made reservations for dinner. We 
were both impressed with the good food and service. During 
dinner, told me how proud he/she was of 
me because of my . 
I was relaxed and open with him/her, and we had fun talking 
about what was happening in our lives. 1 told him/her I was 
especially optimistic about the next few months because 
After dinner, we met a friend of mine and went to a movie in 
campustown. I timed it well so that we missed the long 
lines and got right into the theater. The movie was 
impressive. We talked about it as we left the theater and 
headed for a late night snack at . 
This morning, and I went for brunch 
at 11:00 at a nice Ames restaurant. He/She told me that 
he/she liked my friend that he/she met last night because 
. Before 
he/she left this afternoon, we went for a relaxing walk 
through campus. The weather was beautiful as I showed 
him/her the building where I have one 
of my favorite classes, . We talked and 
laughed as we headed back to my place. It was obvious that 
had enjoyed the visit with me. All in 
all, this weekend went well and was fun. 
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Appendix I 
Proximal, negative scenario 
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Allow yourself to relax as you carefully read the 
description and journal entry below. As you read, begin to 
mentally experience the situations using all of your senses. 
Imagine not only the sights and sounds, but also the 
sensations of touch, smell and taste that go along with the 
situations. Afterward, take a few moments to close your 
eyes and allow yourself to get into the description as much 
as possible before going on to the next step. 
General description: Imagine yourself sitting in your 
bedroom alone at school on a Sunday evening a few months 
from now. You can hear the wind blowing and you are glad to 
be inside away from the cold. You sit back and relax after 
studying for a while. Your thoughts drift back to the 
weekend you just spent with your (mother, 
father, brother, sister, other relative, or high school 
friend). He/She left for home a this afternoon after 
visiting you at school. 
You take out the small notebook where you have been 
keeping notes about some of your memorable college 
experiences (both good and bad). You pick up your pen and 
get comfortable, and then begin writing your latest entry. 
Imagine that you make the following entry. Go slowly and 
pause to imagine yourself in the situations described. Then 
fill in the blanks with details as you imagine them. 
Date: , 19 
left for home this afternoon at 3:00 
after spending the weekend. He/She got here Saturday at 
noon. I hadn't seen him/her since . 
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I forgot to make arrangements for Sat. afternoon, so we 
ended up spending the day at the 
(museum, ballgame, mall, park, etc.) together, where we had 
a lousy time because . 
After that, we had to wait quite a while to get into a nice 
Oriental restaurant for dinner because I didn't make 
reservations. We were both disappointed with the food and 
service. During dinner, told me how 
concerned he/she was because of my . 
I was tense and inhibited with him/her, and we found it 
uncomfortable talking about what was happening in our lives. 
I told him/her I was especially pessimistic about the next 
few months because . 
After dinner, we met a friend of mine and went to a movie in 
campustown. I timed it badly, so that we had to stand in a 
long line to get into the theater. The movie was not 
impressive. We talked about it as we left the theater and 
headed for a late night snack at . 
This morning, and I went for brunch 
at 11:00 at a nice Ames restaurant. He/She told me that 
he/she didn't like my friend that he/she met last night 
because . Before 
he/she left this afternoon, we went for a quick walk through 
campus. The weather was miserable as I showed him/her the 
building where I have one of my favorite 
classes, . We were both quiet and upset 
as we headed back to my place. It was obvious that 
had not enjoyed the visit with me. All 
in all, this weekend went terribly and was miserable. 
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Appendix J 
Distal, positive scenario 
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Allow yourself to relax as you carefully read the 
description and journal entry below. As you read, begin to 
mentally experience the situations using all of your senses. 
Imagine not only the sights and sounds, but also the 
sensations of touch, smell and taste that go along with the 
situations. Afterward, take a few moments to close your 
eyes and allow yourself to get into the description as much 
as possible before going on to the next step. 
General description: Imagine yourself sitting in your 
own home 25 years from now. Imagine that you are the parent 
of a 19 year old (son or daughter) who is a first 
year college student. It is Sunday evening and you are 
sitting alone in your home, after spending the weekend with 
on his/her first visit home from school. Your 
wife/husband has been away from home on a business trip and 
will get home tomorrow. You can hear the wind blowing and 
you are glad to be inside away from the cold. You sit back 
and relax as your thoughts drift back to events of the 
weekend with . He/She left to go back to school 
this afternoon. 
You take out the smal1 notebook where you have been 
keeping notes about some of your memorable experiences as a 
parent (both good and bad). You pick up your pen and get 
comfortable, and then begin writing your latest entry. 
Imagine that you make the following entry. Go slowly and 
pause to imagine yourself in the situations described. Then 
fill in the blanks with details as you imagine them. 
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Date: , 20 
left for school this afternoon at 3:00 
after spending the weekend. He/She got here Saturday at 
noon. I hadn't seen him/her since . 
I arranged to spent Sat. afternoon at the 
(museum, ballgame, mall, park, etc.) together, where we had 
a great time because . 
After that, we went to a nice Oriental restaurant where we 
were seated quickly because I had made reservations for 
dinner. We were both impressed with the good food and 
service. During dinner, told me how 
proud he/she was of me because of my . 
I was relaxed and open with him/her, and we had fun talking 
about what was happening in our lives. I told him/her I was 
especially optimistic about the next few months because 
After dinner, we went to a movie downtown. I timed it well 
so that we missed the long lines and got right into the 
theater. The movie was impressive. We talked about it as 
we left the theater and headed for a late night snack at 
This morning, and I went for brunch 
at 11:00 at a nice restaurant. He/She told me that he/she 
liked spending time alone with me without the rest of the 
family around for a change last night because 
Before he/she left this afternoon, we went for a relaxing 
walk around town. The (fall, winter, 
spring, summer) weather was beautiful as I showed him/her 
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the building where I am now working in 
my new position as a . We talked and 
laughed as we headed back home. It was obvious that 
had enjoyed the visit with me. All in 
all, this weekend with went well and was fun. 
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Distal, negative scenario 
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Allow yourself to relax as you carefully read the 
description and journal entry below. As you read, begin to 
mentally experience the situations using all of your senses. 
Imagine not only the sights and sounds, but also the 
sensations of touch, smell and taste that go along with the 
situations. Afterward, take a few moments to close your 
eyes and allow yourself to get into the description as much 
as possible before going on to the next step. 
General description: Imagine yourself sitting in your 
own home 25 years from now. Imagine that you are the parent 
of a 19 year old (son or daughter) who is a first 
year college student. It is Sunday evening and you are ' 
sitting alone in your home, after spending the weekend with 
on his/her first visit home from school. Your 
wife/husband has been away from home on a business trip and 
will get home tomorrow. You can hear the wind blowing and 
you are glad to be inside away from the cold. You sit back 
and relax as your thoughts drift back to events of the 
weekend with . He/She left to go back to school 
this afternoon. 
You take out the small notebook where you have been 
keeping notes about some of your memorable experiences as a 
parent (both good and bad). You pick up your pen and get 
comfortable, and then begin writing your latest entry. 
Imagine th#t you make the following entry. Go slowly and 
pause to imagine yourself in the situations described before 
filling in the blanks with details as you imagine them. 
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Date: , 20 
left for school this afternoon at 3:00 
after spending the weekend. He/She got here Saturday at 
noon. I hadn't seen him/her since . 
I forgot to make arrangements for Sat. afternoon, so we 
ended up spending the day at the 
(museum, ballgame, mall, park, etc.) together, where we had 
a lousy time because . 
After that, we had to wait quite a while to get into a nice 
Oriental restaurant for dinner because I didn't make 
reservations. We were both disappointed with the food and 
service. During dinner, told me how 
concerned he/she was because of my . 
I was tense and inhibited with him/her, and we found it 
uncomfortable talking about what was happening in our lives. 
I told him/her I was especially pessimistic about the next 
few months because . 
After dinner, we went to a movie downtown. I timed it 
badly, so that we had to stand in a long line to get into 
the theater. The movie was not impressive. We talked about 
it as we left the theater and headed for a late night snack 
at . 
This morning, and I went for brunch 
at 11:00 at a nice restaurant. He/She told me that he/she 
didn't liked spending time alone with me without the rest of 
the family around last night because 
Before he/she left this afternoon, we went for a quick walk 
around town. The (fall, winter. 
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spring, summer) weather was miserable as I showed him/her 
the building where I am now working in 
my new position as a . We were quiet 
and upset as we headed back home. It was obvious that 
had not enjoyed the visit with me. All 
in all, this weekend went terribly and was miserable. 
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Appendix L 
State self-focus measure 
I l l  
Please read each of the following statements and rate them 
according to how well they describe you while you were 
reading the journal entry. This is a 5 point scale with 1 
meaning definitely false and 5 meaning definitely true. 
DEFINITELY DEFINITELY 
FALSE 1 2 3 4 5 TRUE 
I was trying to figure myself out. 
I was generally aware of myself. 
I reflected about myself alot. 
I was the subject of my own fantasy. 
I wasn't scrutinize myself. 
I was generally attentive to my inner feelings. 
I was constantly examining my motives. 
I sometimes had the feeling that I was off 
somewhere watching myself. 
I was alert to changes in my mood. 
I was aware of the way my mind worked when I 
worked through the problems. 
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Manipulation check items 
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Please provide the following general information by marking 
the scales below and by marking the appropriate blanks. 
How similar was the situation in the journal entry to your 
current life? 
VERY VERY 
SIMILAR XXXXXXXXX DIFFERENT 
Before today, how often had you thought about this possible 
situation? 
VERY OFTEN XXXXXXXXX NEVER 
How easy did you find it to imagine yourself in the 
situation described in the journal entry? 
VERY EASY XXXXXXXXX VERY HARD 
How likely do you think you are to actually experience a 
situation similar to the one described in the journal entry? 
VERY VERY 
LIKELY XXXXXXXXX UNLIKELY 
How desirable would this situation be to you? 
VERY VERY 
DESIRABLE XXXXXXXXX UNDESIRABLE 
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Distraction task 
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Please answer each question by indicating how you think the 
people specified in each question would respond. 
1. Rank order al1 of the following topics in the order that 
you think they concern couples who have staved married for 
more than 20 years. Use the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, where 1 
= this topic is of most concern and 5 = this topic is of 
least concern. 
spouse relationship 
family relationships 
career success 
financial success 
personal health 
2. Please put a "1" next to the political/social topic 
listed below that you think most American adults report 
matters most to them and a "5" next to the one they report 
matters 1 east. (Only rate these two alternatives.) 
the environment 
the economy 
foreign affairs 
social programs 
national defense 
3. Rank order al1 of the following concerns in the order 
that you think that they are reported as mattering to 
college students who graduated in the top 25% of their 
classes. 
family 
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grades 
dating 
relationships with friends 
money 
4. Put a "1" next to the characteristic that you think 
successful managers report as mattering the most to them 
when evaluating an employee, and a "5" next to the one that 
they report matters least. 
employee works hard 
employee is on time 
employee takes initiative 
employee follows orders exactly 
employee gets along well with coworkers 
5. Put a "1" next to the statement which is most likely to 
be supported by people who report that they have done wel1 
professional1v (regardless of field) and a "5" next to the 
statement which is least 1ikelv to be supported by them. 
(Only rate these two alternatives.) 
Success is 5% luck and 95% effort. 
The ability to get along well with others is critical 
in any field. 
Leadership ability is the best predictor of success. 
A good education is one's most valuable possession. 
Anyone can make it if they try. 
6. Put a "1" next to the statement below which you feel is 
most descriptive of the attitude of the average college 
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student toward cheating, and a "5" next to the least 
descriptive statement. (Only rate these two alternatives.) 
Cheating on anything at any time is totally wrong. 
It's O.K. to cheat if you know that several other 
people in the class are doing so. 
It's O.K. to cheat if you know that you could have 
done the work honestly if you'd just had enough time. 
It's O.K. to cheat if you're sure you won't get 
caught. 
It's O.K. to help someone else cheat even though it's 
not O.K. for you to cheat. 
7. Put a "1" next to the quality that you think most 
American adults report as most important in choosing their 
friends, and a "5" by the least important quality. (Only 
rate these two alternatives.) 
social contacts of potential friend 
physical attractiveness of a potential friend 
financial standing of a potential friend 
interests and preferred activities of a potential 
friend 
political beliefs of a potential friend 
8. Which ONE of the following opinions do you feel BEST 
describes the opinions of most American adults on the topic 
of abortion? Please SELECT ONLY ONE RESPONSE. 
Abortion is completely wrong and should be illegal. 
Abortion should only be legal in cases of immediate 
physical danger to the mother's life. 
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Abortion should only be legal in cases of immediate 
physical danger to the mother's life, incest, and 
rape. 
Abortion should be legal for any reason. 
Abortion should be legal for any reason and 
financially subsidized by the federal government to 
make it available to all women. 
9. Which ONE of the following options do you think BEST 
describes the percentage of American adults who report that 
they have ever cheated on their income taxes? Please SELECT 
ONLY ONE RESPONSE. 
Less than 5% 25%-50% 
57.-10% 50%-75% 
10%-25% more than 75% 
10. Which ONE of the following options do you think BEST 
describes the attitude of most college students toward 
premarital sex? Please SELECT ONLY ONE OPTION. 
Sex on the first date is not wrong and is expected by 
most college students. 
Casual sex is not immoral, even if you are sleeping 
with more than one person during a period of time. 
Premarital sex is O.K. if the couple have known each 
other for a while before sleeping together. 
Premarital sex is only O.K. if it takes place in a 
committed, monogamous relationship. 
Premarital sex is wrong and should be discouraged. 
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Recal1 measure 
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Please answer as many of the following questions as you can 
about the details provided in the journal entry, using as 
close to the exact wording as possible. 
1. On what day of the week was the journal entry made? 
2. What time did your visitor leave in the afternoon? 
3. What was the weather like as you made the journal entry? 
4. What type of restaurant did you go to for dinner? 
5. When did your visitor arrive for the weekend? 
6. What did you write your journal entry in? 
7. What was your feeling while you ate dinner at the 
restaurant? 
8. How was the service at the restaurant? 
9. Where did you go to see the movie after dinner? 
10. What did you talk about after the movie? 
11. What time did you have brunch? 
12. What was talked about during brunch? 
13. What was the date of the journal entry? 
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14. When had you last seen your visitor before this visit? 
15. What did you say to your visitor during dinner about 
your future outlook? 
16. Where did you get a snack on Saturday evening? 
17. What was your visitor's reaction to your friend 
18. What building did you show your visitor? 
19. What was the weather like during your walk? 
20. What did you say was your favorite class? 
